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Abstract
My Master’s Project focuses on local fusion centers and the need for improved information
sharing practices among law enforcement partners. After the tragic event of September 11th in
2001, the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice recognized a
communication gap between law enforcement agencies and a lack of effective information
sharing efforts. Fusion centers play a significant role in supporting both criminal and terrorist
investigations due to their ability to act as a conduit between various law enforcement partners.
Due to their important responsibilities as information sharing hubs that provide valuable analysis
and dissemination of information and intelligence, it is essential to enhance information practices
among the centers. My Master’s Project details a strategy that will assist in advancing
information sharing capabilities among local fusion centers to better detect, investigate, mitigate,
and avert threats. Specifically, this paper proposes a two-part strategy that entails strengthening
current partnerships among fusion centers and law enforcement agencies and developing and
implementing a standardized training program for intelligence analysts. Through improved
collaborative efforts, fusion centers will be able to better identify, mitigate, and prevent threats to
ensure public safety and the security of the country.
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Chapter 1: Strategy
Introduction
Local intelligence fusion centers provide a unique opportunity for enhancing information
sharing among local, state, and federal authorities. By communicating with local, state, and
federal authorities, fusion centers are hopefully better able to compile data and identify emerging
threats. After identifying threat-related information, fusion centers share the information with
local, state and federal governments, and vice versa. Thus, local, state, and federal authorities are
better prepared to investigate, and potentially prevent, emerging threats.
Although a few intelligence fusion centers existed prior to September 11th, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) helped to
develop several new fusion centers mainly as a response to the tragic event of September 11th
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2009). Owned and operated by local and state authorities, with
the support of federal law enforcement, fusion centers were created to implement unique
facilities to serve the purpose of detecting terrorism-related information and sharing the
information among local, state, and federal authorities (FBI, 2009). The 9/11 Commission Report
dealing with the September 11th tragedy detailed a lack of effective communication among all
agencies, from local law enforcement to federal agencies (National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks, 2004). By not communicating developing information with each other, law enforcement
and government agencies neglected to identify the emerging threat. Had they communicated
clearly with each other and shared developing information, they could have detected, and
possibly prevented, the attack. As a result, fusion centers were created to serve a critical role in
identifying, investigating, analyzing, and sharing emerging threat-related information in an
efficient and effective manner.
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According to DHS (2017a), there are currently 80 fusion centers in the United States that
are positioned in various local communities and states to support law enforcement agencies and
the federal government in identifying threat-related information. Although all local fusion
centers serve the same purpose of identifying emerging threats and sharing the information with
the federal government, as well as other levels of government, there is no standard system in
place for fusion centers to operate. The lack of a standard set of operations regarding information
sharing makes it difficult for fusion centers to identify, investigate, analyze, and share
information among local, state, and federal authorities. In order to help improve information
sharing among fusion centers, there must be effective partnerships among the analysts, local law
enforcement agencies, and local Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) as well as the creation of a
standardized training program for intelligence analysts.
Support for Strategy
In 2004, the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) was established by the President and
Congress. Its purpose was to create a trusted partnership among all levels of government, as well
as the private sector and foreign partners, to detect, prevent, and mitigate the effects of terrorist
threats against the United States. The partnership established under the ISE enabled the
appropriate exchange of terrorism-related information among five communities. The
communities included intelligence, law enforcement, defense, homeland security, and foreign
affairs. The exchange entailed securing timely and accurate information among the
aforementioned communities combating terrorism (Department of Justice, 2008).
As part of the National Strategy for Information Sharing, the federal government
promoted the use of local fusion centers in order to create an integrated network of facilities that
fosters information sharing. The federal government helps to sustain the centers through grant
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funding, training, and technical assistance. Through the ISE, fusion centers enable effective
communication of locally generated terrorism-related information, such as incident reports and
suspicious activity, to government agencies, other fusion centers, and local law enforcement.
Communicating with other localities enables fusion centers to better prepare information at the
local level and distribute the information to the federal and other related government entities
(National Security Intelligence, 2007).
Partnerships. Partnerships encourage collaboration and communication. They encourage
support between the groups through training, technical assistance, deployment of personnel,
access to databases and networks, and sharing of various resources (DOJ, 2008). Integrating
resources between fusion centers and law enforcement from the local context creates a national
capacity to identify, analyze, and share information in support of efforts to guard the country
(Department of Homeland Security, 2017b).
There are several success stories that highlight the importance of partnerships between
local fusion centers, local law enforcement agencies, and joint terrorism task forces. In 2009, the
Colorado Information Analysis Center aided an investigation of a local missing woman with
potential ties to terrorism. After analyzing the investigation report, the analysis center shared the
information with the local joint terrorism task force which added to an open federal investigation
on the woman. The analysis center continued to cooperate with the joint terrorism task force on
the investigation and together they were able to link several other individuals with prior ties to
terrorism-related crimes to the missing woman. Based upon the collaborative efforts among the
analysis center and joint terrorism task force, the suspect was apprehended and later convicted
for providing material support to terrorists (DHS, 2015a).
Another success story took place when a law enforcement officer in San Antonio
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reported information of a Minnesota-based hate group to their local fusion center in Southwest
Texas subsequent to making contact with an individual who had ties to the group. After
reviewing the report and beginning research on the individual and associated hate group, the
fusion center informed the joint terrorism task force of San Antonio who then referred the
information to both the Minnesota joint terrorism task force and Minnesota Fusion Center. The
Minnesota Fusion Center coordinated with local law enforcement in Minnesota to determine if
there was a viable domestic threat in their jurisdiction. The following day, with the help of the
Minnesota Police Department Bomb Squad, the FBI executed a search warrant of the suspected
individual's home, uncovered suspected pipe bombs, Molotov cocktails, and firearms, and
eventually arrested the individual (DHS, 2015b).
Training. In addition to partnerships, local fusion centers rely heavily on the capabilities
of intelligence analysts. The analysts receive training, coordinated by DOJ and DHS, in order to
acquire skills in identifying, collecting, and analyzing information. While analysts have access to
training workshops on topics such as risk analysis, privacy rights, and security (DHS, 2017d), it
is important that analysts in fusion centers receive standardized training to ensure a common set
of capabilities. Developing a common set of proficiencies among all analysts in fusion centers
ensures that they receive baseline capabilities for information collection and sharing. It also
improves communication among analysts in different fusion centers as they will all have learned
about the same intelligence databases and acquired the same knowledge on analysis and
dissemination processes.
In 2010 the DOJ documented common analytic competencies that local, state, and tribal
intelligence analysts in fusion centers must exhibit. In order to address the necessity of common
competencies, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) initiated the State,
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Local, and Tribal (SLT) Training Working Group under the support and purview of DHS.
Managed by the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) Mission Support Division
(MSD) Intelligence Training Branch, the group researched and consolidated common analytic
competencies from previous intelligence analyst and law enforcement training documents that
would aid fusion center personnel in developing necessary intelligence proficiencies (DOJ,
2010a).
The efforts accomplished by the SLT Training Working Group, along with members of
the Fusion Center Management Group’s Technical Assistance and Training Working Group,
established a baseline of capabilities for fusion center analysts. The analytical competency areas
include thinking critically within the intelligence cycle, sharing information and collaborating,
fusing intelligence and law enforcement tradecraft in a homeland security environment,
communicating analytic observations and judgements or generating analytic products, and
turning concepts and principles into action. Further competencies include accessing sources,
anticipating change, establishing trusted networks of key contributors, using software tools to
analyze information, producing threat and vulnerability assessments, and evaluating and
disseminating suspicious activity reports. Because the analysts may handle both criminal and
national intelligence, they have to possess skills, abilities, and knowledge that aids in detecting
and investigating various types of intelligence. Their unique environment creates a need for
analysts to receive training on specific analytic tradecraft skills that includes the handling,
storage, and maintenance of locally generated information, criminal intelligence and a
connection to homeland security, and both classified and unclassified intelligence that is
generated from the Intelligence Community (DOJ, 2010a).
Furthermore, intelligence analysts in fusion centers are required to gain knowledge on the
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intelligence cycle, different types of intelligence, crime-specific training, various tactical,
operational, and strategic products, and fusion centers’ mission, plans, functions, and procedures.
Intelligence analysts must also develop knowledge on different topics related to information
regarding both criminal activity and terrorism-related intelligence. Recognizing the links
between information related to various criminal activity and terrorism-related intelligence guides
analysts in identifying activities that are indicative of precursor behaviors, terrorist activities, and
threats (DOJ, 2010a).
Strategy
Strengthening existing partnerships and creating standardized training for intelligence
analysts will assist in enhancing information gathering and sharing. While these strategies enable
effective information sharing among local fusion centers, several decisions regarding the
strategies must still be made.
Partnerships. In order to establish better communication between the different partners,
all fusion centers should have a few designated representatives from local law enforcement and
local joint terrorism task forces staffed in the centers. While still working in the field for ongoing
investigations, the local law enforcement personnel and terrorism task force agents will work out
of the fusion centers, side by side the analysts. Having these liaisons work side by side with the
analysts allows the representatives to keep the analysts constantly updated on threat-related
information that they discover in the field. It also allows the analysts to inform the
representatives of developing intelligence so that the representatives can then communicate such
developments back to their agencies. Additionally, the representatives assigned to work in the
centers should either have a background in analysis or have previously worked closely with
intelligence analysts, making it easier to understand technical analysis terms, briefings, and
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intelligence reports, thus enabling effective communication between them and the analysts.
Another important aspect in strengthening partnerships includes having monthly, face to
face meetings within the local fusion centers. Meetings allow the different partners to speak in
person and learn about progress and updates on ongoing cases. Most local law enforcement and
local joint terrorism task forces are uniquely situated to remain physically close to local fusion
centers (FBI, 2009). These field-based personnel must take advantage of their locations and
deploy several officers and agents to meet often in the fusion centers. At the meetings analysts
should provide bulletins, briefings, or intelligence products on new cases or information that they
discover. Similarly, officers and agents can discuss new leads regarding their cases. The groups
should also present new suspicious activity reports (SARs) that are considered a top priority.
Overall, the meetings allow analysts and law enforcement personnel to voice communication
concerns and remain updated on cases and trends.
Decisions must also be made regarding security clearances of fusion centers and what
information, as well as how much, they have access to. Security clearances can include various
levels such as Secret-level clearances, Top Secret clearances, and Top Secret-Secure
Compartmentalized Information clearances (Masse, O’Neil, & Rollins, 2007). Information
classification barriers can often cause delays in processing, investigating, and sharing
information. Sponsoring security clearances for non-federal government personnel remains an
issue and reciprocity is often a concern among different levels of law enforcement. Failing to
recognize another’s clearance may at times hinder the other groups from accessing facilities and
computer systems (Masse et al., 2007).
Additionally, security is an important element of fusion centers. Security pertains to
information, databases, documents, and personnel, and consists of measures such as encryption,
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authorization, access control, and confidentiality (DOJ, 2006). Because fusion centers collect and
maintain a vast amount of information, it is important to ensure that the information is stored
safely and remains safeguarded. When fusion centers partner with local law enforcement and
local joint terrorism task forces, several personnel become involved in accessing, utilizing, and
sharing secure information. A breach in security may be an unintended consequence, thus
potentially compromising several cases. For these reasons, it is vital to ensure that information
remains secure. Analysts should remain aware of potential emails that might be embedded with
viruses or malware from hackers. In order to determine how best to protect data, data owners
must consider both policy and technical concerns (DOJ, 2006).
Training. In addition to strengthening partnerships, decisions must be made regarding
the creation and implementation of a standardized training program for intelligence analysts in
fusion centers. Standardized training for intelligence analysts in fusion centers should be a threemonth program to allot for sufficient time to ensure analysts are proficient in several
competencies. First and foremost, analysts must be trained in analysis and dissemination
methods. This includes how to develop reports on crime statistics and trends, write bulletins,
develop maps for hot spots and patterns, and create intelligence briefings. Next, analysts must
learn about several databases and computer systems that they will utilize in their daily routines.
Such databases include Excel, Access, mapping programs, systems for law enforcement contacts
and incident reports, and more. This also includes procedures regarding the storing and
maintenance of information as well as capabilities encompassing social media practices. Lastly,
the analysts must be trained on legal regulations regarding collection methods of information.
Legal information can include laws and regulations related to the gathering, maintenance, and
dissemination of information. Because it is important to identify threats without overstepping
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authority and infringing upon privacy rights, training will require analysts to learn what they are
legally allowed to collect, as well as the methods required to legally acquire or gain access to
certain information (DOJ, 2008).
Discussion
It is envisioned that the proposed two-part strategy will help to improve information
sharing among local fusion centers. Part One of the strategy focuses on strengthening and
developing partnerships between local fusion centers, local law enforcement agencies, and FBI
joint terrorism task forces. Strengthening these partnerships includes improving methods of
communication through the staffing of local law enforcement and joint terrorism task force
personnel in the centers, implementation of monthly meetings, development of security
clearances, and application of precautionary security measures. Part Two of the strategy
encompasses creating a standardized training program for intelligence analysts in fusion centers.
The training must include skills in analysis and dissemination, knowledge on various databases
and computer systems, and the understanding of legal regulations regarding the collection of
information.
Conclusion
In order to successfully detect, and possibly prevent threats, it is important to improve
information sharing among local fusion centers. Fusion centers must partner with local law
enforcement agencies and local FBI joint terrorism task forces to enhance communication and
combine analytic and investigative skills. Additionally, creating standardized training for fusion
center intelligence analysts serves to create uniformity of proficiencies among all fusion centers
as well as enhance the capabilities of the analysts in the centers.
When continuing to develop this two-part strategy to enhance information sharing among
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fusion centers, several questions regarding my strategy may be raised. How will fusion centers,
local law enforcement, and joint terrorism task forces communicate effectively? How will the
training for intelligence analysts be funded? And how will managers help to enable and improve
information sharing? These questions, along with several others, will be further addressed in the
following chapters.
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Chapter 2: Management
Introduction
As demonstrated by the tragedy of September 11th, the lack of efficient, consistent
information sharing among law enforcement and intelligence agencies led to an unprecedented
event that could have been detected, and possibly prevented, had law enforcement and
government agencies worked together effectively to recognize warning signs and suspicious
activity (Nenneman, 2008). Due to the lack of information sharing capabilities, the Department
of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice focused on enhancing information sharing
capabilities among fusion centers (Carter & Carter, 2009).
While information sharing capabilities among fusion centers have advanced, it is
important to continue to develop partnerships among the analysts, local law enforcement
agencies, and joint terrorism task forces as well as create and implement standardized training
for intelligence analysts. In order to accomplish this, it is essential to have leaders who will
ensure that these strategies are not only developed and implemented in the centers, but that they
remain in the centers long term. Fusion centers require managers who will enable effective
communication and information sharing among the centers.
Management Theory
While several management theories exist, the open systems approach to management is
best suited in enhancing communication within and among local fusion centers, and thus
implementing effective information sharing. Originally rooted in biology and social sciences, the
concept of general systems evolved as an organizational theory over time. Recognizing similar
qualities as other organizational theories, several philosophers and theorists developed general
systems as a management practice for organizations (Kast & Rosenzweig, 1972). While often
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studied as a closed system that did not interact with its environment, general systems theory
evolved to include an open systems perspective in organizations. Open systems theory values
communication with the organization’s environment as an effective strategy in enhancing work
productivity (Kast & Rosenzweig, 1972).
A system is composed of interrelated parts that are interconnected. Systems can either be
considered closed or open. While closed systems tend to limit the capabilities of organizations,
an open system promotes working with its environment and outside factors in order to be
successful. An open system exchanges information, material, or energy with its environment.
The system remains in a dynamic relationship with its environment by receiving various inputs,
transforming those inputs in some way, and exporting the outputs thereafter. Such a relationship
allows the open system to establish a constant flow of information both within the organization
and outside the organization. The relationship also allows for feedback between the organization
and its environment to fix any issues that may exist (Kast & Rosenzweig, 1972). Feedback
entails providing information that reflects the outcomes of acts completed by an individual,
group, or an organization (Chikere & Nwoka, 2015).
Rather than reducing an entity into its parts, open system theory emphasizes the relations
between the parts. The organization is a system with integrated parts that must coordinate
together for efficiency and effectiveness. Internally, those who work inside the organization
perform both their individual and group tasks while externally, several transactions exist between
the organization and outside institutions. The different parts both within and outside the
organization collaborate and work together to ensure success overall. In addition, it is important
for individuals within the organization to be aware of the changes that exist in their environment
in order to adjust to the changing demands and easily adapt to them. An organization that is not
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sensitive to its environment will hardly survive. Technology, social, and economic phenomena
are not static. Rather, they are always changing and organizations must adapt in order to survive
(Chikere & Nwoka, 2015).
The open systems approach to management consists of several core components. It
focuses on cooperation, synergy, and communication in order to exchange necessary information
with other subsystems or groups (Von Bertalanffy, 1972). In order to collaborate and work
together with other groups to bring about success, the open systems approach to management
uses anticipatory control. Anticipatory control entails anticipating errors before they occur. The
system often relies on institutions outside the organization so that if a possible error or incident
should occur in one part, the other institutions that the organization converses with can aid in
mitigating the repercussions. The management theory also takes corrective measures through the
managerial functions of planning the goals of the organization, staffing individuals to work
within and outside the organization, leading the process of the transformation of products,
organizing the final outputs, and controlling the flow of information. Lastly, the theory seeks to
continuously improve an organization. Rather than remaining stable, even if the system is
already effective, the open systems approach to management requires constant learning and
improving to better the organization. Essentially, open systems theory seeks to achieve a
dynamic equilibrium (Chikere & Nwoka, 2015).
In order to determine if the open systems management theory is being practiced in
modern day organizations, a study was performed on a successful, indigenous organization based
in Port Harcourt, Nigeria. The organization was chosen as the case study because it demonstrated
similar core components, such as the structure of subsystems and interrelated parts, of the
systems theory. The study began with a preliminary survey on the company. The study
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population was drawn from a list of three departments within the organization. The respondents
who agreed and consented to applying the systems theory of management were further selected
for the main study. Thirty questionnaires were administered to the respondents of the three
departments. They demonstrated an observable relationship that existed among the departments,
or subsystems, that revealed that the components of the organization were connected together.
The respondents noted the common flow of communication between the departments and its
importance to the success of the organization. The respondents also showed that the organization
functioned by often interacting with similar institutions that complemented its efforts and
supported the overall success of the organization. Based on the questionnaires and similar traits
of the systems theory, the study concluded that the open systems theory was in effect at the
organization based in Port Harcourt. The study also recommended that other modern
organizations adopt the open systems approach to management to enhance growth and
profitability (Chikere & Nwoka, 2015).
In addition to the open systems approach to management, the team leadership model is
another valuable management theory in building successful information sharing capabilities
among local fusion centers. While there have been several different developments of the team
leadership theory, Susan Kogler Hill proposed a team leaderships model that specifically focuses
on the ability of the leader to monitor team work and ensure team effectiveness by promoting
strong communication and problem solving skills (Northouse, 2012).
Hill’s team leadership model is used to aid leaders who often manage groups with similar
capabilities and tasks. It helps leaders determine team issues and concerns, as well as several
alternatives to resolve the issues, while remaining cognizant of the team’s capabilities, resources,
and external challenges and opportunities. The model allows leaders to be able to work with their
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teams within the organization as well as externally, with other groups, outside the organization.
Such leaders are able to encourage networking, support, and information sharing with their
external environment. They are also able to balance both the internal and external demands
placed on their teams as well as to know when to intervene in one or both (Northouse, 2013).
Teams are often complex, dynamic systems that exist in greater systemic contexts of
cultures, people, structures, and technologies. As a result, leaders must create synergy within the
team and recognize the value in focusing on tasks and people to develop successful team
building skills. Task‐focused behaviors include work apportionment, goal setting, process
structuring, adapting to changes, information seeking, and feedback. Empirical studies often
demonstrate that task‐focused behaviors relate directly to team effectiveness. Interpersonal skills
also contribute greatly to team effectiveness. People-focused behaviors include facilitating team
member participation in the group, developing a positive climate, harmonizing problems, setting
standards of behavior, and encouraging friendly and supportive behavior. Team leaders must also
develop a strong sense of trust among all members and groups to enable constructive feedback
and team resiliency (Gerras & Clark, 2011). Such leaders require an abundance of trust,
credibility, and competency in order to support their teams (Nenneman, 2008). These qualities
combined enable the team leadership model to successfully acquire team effectiveness as well as
overall work productivity and success in the organization.
The team leadership model focuses on three broad responsibilities for the leaders to
accomplish. First, leaders must enforce efficient productivity and improve the team’s ability in
accomplishing tasks. This includes focusing on desired goals and outcomes as well as creating
certain standards for individual and team performances to be successful in reaching the goals.
Second, they must improve the team members’ interpersonal skills and intra-team relationships.
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In order to accomplish this, team leaders support collaboration among team members, coach
them to help improve social skills, and expand team commitment. Third, team leaders must be
aware of developing team building skills within the organization as well as contributing to
building similar skills outside the organization. External leadership action requires keeping the
team connected to its external environment. Keeping the team connected to its environment
involves creating strong alliances with outside sources to gain access to information regularly
(Northouse, 2013).
Application of Theory to Strategy
The open systems approach to management and the team leadership model provide
valuable practices that assist in strengthening partnerships with outside agencies and enforcing
training for analysts to support information sharing among fusion centers. By establishing
constant communication, networking, and team work with outside agencies, the aforementioned
management theories provide fusion centers with the necessary abilities to regularly exchange
information with their partners. Similarly, supporting enhancement of capabilities and team
productivity for those who share similar tasks and responsibilities supports the need for training
for all fusion center analysts.
Challenges. While implementing these strategies to improve information sharing,
managers may experience some challenges. Local fusion centers rely heavily on partnerships as
part of their system, yet analysts and law enforcement personnel develop and utilize different
reports such as briefings, maps, and strategic and tactical products. Additionally, a lack of trusted
partnerships and incompatible computer systems and software are often obstacles that can
negatively impact the ability to share intelligence efficiently (DOJ, 2006).
Although managers oversee and work with different groups that often perform different
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duties, it is their responsibility to create a level of communication that each can understand.
Fusion center managers must collaborate with managers from local law enforcement and joint
terrorism task forces to assign a few members of these agencies to be staffed within the fusion
centers. Staffing the centers with these law enforcement liaisons supports the centers’
productivity in communicating and sharing information to better develop intelligence that aids in
ongoing efforts to prevent threats.
Additionally, because analysts and law enforcement personal have different access levels
and security clearances, having the representatives in the centers allows these personnel to
collaborate with one another in gathering information more efficiently and effectively. If certain
data is needed regarding imminent threats that analysts may not have access to, they can
collaborate with their law enforcement liaisons to access such information. Similarly, the law
enforcement representatives can rely on the analysts for access to various databases.
Finally, face to face meetings allow the groups to discuss new information, leads, or
cases in detail. Held at the fusion centers, each meeting must consist of a number of analysts,
officers, agents, and managers. At the meetings the analysts must present bulletins or briefings
on updated information they acquire on possible threats for the officers and agents to follow up
on. Analysts should also present intelligence products they create for ongoing investigations.
Officers and agents should present new leads or cases they discover in the field in order for
analysts to gather information on possible persons of interest or suspects. Either group may also
present new suspicious activity reports that are a priority. Ultimately, meetings give each group
the opportunity to discuss any communication concerns, updates on emerging threats, and
improved methods and techniques to disrupt them. They also help to encourage trust among the
partners.
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In addition to partnerships, fusion centers rely heavily on the skills of intelligence
analysts and their ability to coordinate with each other. There is no standard training system,
however, for all analysts in fusion centers to undergo. A lack of unified standards and policies
can negatively impact analysts’ ability to effectively share information and intelligence (DOJ,
2006). Similarly, if intelligence analysts are not prepared to collect, analyze, and disseminate
information, it could adversely impact the quality of intelligence produced and its timely
dissemination, ultimately negatively affecting major criminal or terrorism-related cases.
Standardized training prepares analysts in gathering and collecting information to avoid such
negative consequences (Nenneman, 2008).
Implementing standardized training for intelligence analysts may be a challenge in that it
requires determining what should be included in the training. Local fusion centers are built on
the capacity of the analysts being able to effectively work together with each other as well as
field-based law enforcement personnel (Northouse, 2013). When individual intelligence analysts
fail to perform their tasks, the entire group of analysts can be negatively affected (Chikere &
Nwoka, 2015). When the entire group fails to effectively accomplish their tasks, there is not
enough production of information to share with the other local groups aiding the investigations.
As a result, information is not properly gathered, cases are not built, and sharing with federal
agencies becomes impossible when there is nothing substantial to share.
Team work and collaboration is a vital element of fusion centers. By creating
standardized training, managers are able to foster similar skills, traits, and characteristics of
intelligence analysts. A common set of competencies supports better communication,
collaboration, and interoperability among the analysts, thus creating effective team work and
productivity (DOJ, 2010a). Analysts must acquire skills in analysis and dissemination. They
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must gain technical skills and knowledge regarding computer systems and databases.
Additionally, they must learn the legal guidelines regarding collection of information and how to
store and maintain intelligence. By acquiring the same skills and gaining access to the same
systems, analysts are able to easily work with each other and exchange information.
In order to maintain growth of the analysts during and after the training, feedback should
be constantly present in and among fusion centers. Feedback allows analysts within different
centers to voice concerns, as well as give positive feedback, for continuous growth and
development. Managers ensure that feedback remains an integral component for the centers by
helping analysts to assess their performances monthly, adapt to changes as necessary, and
continue to develop by discussing new ideas to quickly and efficiently prevent viable threats
(Morgeson, DeRue, & Karam, 2010).
Lastly, managers must encourage trust among the analysts in the local fusion centers
(Morgeson et al., 2010). Building trust helps managers to allow individual analysts to perform
their tasks on their own while also knowing when it is necessary to intervene among them. Trust
also provides the analysts the ability to easily go to their managers should there be internal, as
well as external, problems that could potentially hinder the overall group of analysts and their
production in detecting and analyzing threats (Northouse, 2013).
Conclusion
While some challenges may arise when implementing strategies to enhance partnerships
among fusion centers and develop standardized training for analysts, managers can help to
implement such plans through effective communication. In order to help improve information
sharing among local fusion centers, the open systems approach to management and the team
leadership model will guide managers in overcoming challenges. Through such practices,
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information sharing among fusion centers will be improved, leading to better detection, as well
as prevention, of threats to the country.
In Chapter 3, a strategic plan and budget to implement and execute measures for
improving information sharing among fusion centers will be proposed. It will address budget
issues that may arise when implementing partnerships and intelligence training to enhance
information sharing capabilities among local fusion centers.
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Chapter 3: Strategic Planning and Budgeting
Introduction
Improving fusion centers’ abilities to share information will allow the centers to continue
to grow in their capacities to detect and prevent threats. Updating partnerships with local law
enforcement and local FBI joint terrorism task forces and developing a standardized training
program for intelligence analysts will help to improve information sharing. In order to
successfully place this strategy into practice to enhance information sharing among fusion
centers, a strategic plan must be developed.
Strategic Planning
When addressing strategy, several components must be considered. Such components
include fusion centers’ purpose, mandates, stakeholders, vision statement, mission statement,
internal & external factors, strategic issues, performance goals, performance indicators, and their
budget and resources. These components make up the detailed strategic plan that will assist in
enhancing information sharing among fusion centers.
Mandates. Mandates include a description of what an organization has to accomplish
based on the services and programs it offers. Mandates are orders or policies that the
organization seeks to strive for and carry out. They can be expressed both informally or formally
through various methods such as contracts, group expectations, partnership agreements, or
policies (Community Literacy of Ontario, 2013). For example, in 2008 the Baseline Capabilities
for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers was created to supplement Fusion Center
Guidelines in order to: 1) establish baseline operation standards for fusion centers and 2) outline
the necessary capabilities for fusion centers (DHS, 2017a). These documents are formal
mandates of fusion centers.
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The main expectation of fusion centers is to keep Americans safe and the country secure
by detecting threats before they can become viable. Fusion centers can deliver this expectation
by improving information sharing. Each partner involved in the information sharing process
plays a vital role. Local law enforcement, local joint terrorism task forces, and analysts must
accomplish their individual tasks and then share information they develop with each other to
build cases and discover emerging threats. Similarly, the training program for fusion center
intelligence analysts provides analysts with the skills necessary to accomplish their individual
tasks as well as collaborate with groups and share information more seamlessly.
Stakeholders. Stakeholders are individuals involved in an organization who have either
an interest, stake, or claim in the organization, in the activities it partakes in, or how well it
performs. Stakeholders are categorized into two groups: inside stakeholders and outside
stakeholders. Inside stakeholders comprise those who are closest to the organization and have the
most direct claim on the organization’s resources. Outside stakeholders include those who
neither own the organization nor are employed by it. Rather, outside stakeholders are customers,
suppliers, the government, unions, local communities, and/or the public who may still have a
general interest in the organization or its activities (Jones, 1994).
Local fusion centers collaborate with several partners including local, state, tribal,
territorial, federal, and private sector partners. It is their connection with each of these partners
that makes fusion centers unique in conducting analysis, facilitating information sharing, and
assisting law enforcement and homeland security professionals in investigating and responding
to threats (DHS, 2017a).
For my particular strategy to improve information sharing methods, intelligence analysts,
local law enforcement officers, and FBI joint terrorism task force agents are the inside
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stakeholders. The analysts gather, analyze, disseminate, and share threat-related information.
They create several intelligence products, including intelligence briefings and threat assessments,
and perform other tasks including charting, graphing, and mapping (DOJ, 2006). Local law
enforcement conduct investigations, follow up on leads, and provide situational awareness of
their localities and communities for both the analysts and homeland security partners (DHS,
2017a). This contributes greatly to both the safety of local communities as well as national
security. Lastly, local joint terrorism task forces provide expertise on terrorism-related cases.
Although managed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the task forces consist of federal,
state, local, tribunal, and territorial law enforcement partners. Together they are integrated task
forces that combat terrorism on both a national and international scale. As a result of their skills
and capabilities, their partnership with fusion centers is vital to the success of the centers. They
assist in conducting counter-terrorism investigations while providing information for intelligence
products and assessments (DHS, 2016).
In addition to inside stakeholders, the main outside stakeholders involved in fusion
centers are local communities and the general public. Citizens of the United States have an
interest in the activities of fusion centers as the centers seek to keep the country secure and
citizens safe from harm. Collaborating with various local law enforcement officials and
homeland security partners provides for the safety of the public from criminal and terrorist
activity. The general public expects the centers and their law enforcement partners to identify
and investigate threats to keep them, and their country, safe.
Vision statement. Vision statements address where an organization is headed in future
years and what it seeks to accomplish over time. They should be inspirational whereby the
stakeholders of the organization will want to strive for the vision and accomplish the goals
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involved (Olsen, 2008). Through information sharing with various law enforcement partners,
fusion centers strive to identify, investigate, and prevent serious threats. While fusion centers
continue to develop new and efficient ways to share information, they are built on the foundation
of detecting threats early and strive to prevent them and protect citizens. They facilitate unique
information sharing capabilities to promptly detect all serious threats, and thus prevent such
threats and secure Americans’ safety (DHS, 2017a).
Mission statement. Mission statements explain what the organization does, who it may
do it for, and the purpose of the organization (Johnson, 2010). Fusion centers perform several
tasks. They serve as the primary conduit among several partners to continuously exchange
information pertaining to investigations. Fusion centers analyze and disseminate threat-related
information. Their localities allow them to provide a unique perspective on threats, thus
contributing to the national threat picture. They also work with the Department of Homeland
Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis to facilitate the intelligence cycle at the local level
and foster information sharing with stakeholders at the federal level (DHS, 2017d). Based on
such activities, local fusion centers exist to utilize their skills, expertise, and resources in analysis
to share information with law enforcement and maximize their ability to identify, collect,
investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity and ensure public safety (DHS, 2017a).
Internal and external situational analysis. In order to ensure that fusion centers are
successful, it is essential to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the organization. A SWOT
analysis, consisting of identifying strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats, must be
performed to carefully analyze components of fusion centers. The SWOT analysis creates a view
of the current state of the organization to aid in determining how best to build its future. The
strengths and weaknesses are considered through the internal factors of fusion centers whereby
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they have a direct impact on the organization. The opportunities and threats are addressed
through external factors, or the environment, of the centers (Olsen, 2013).
The main strengths of fusion centers include the resources, capabilities, and skills they
possess. Federal agencies provide numerous resources, including technical support and access to
various databases, to fusion centers to support their efforts in detecting threats. Some of the
systems and network resources include the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s LEO Program,
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network (FinCEN), High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA), and several others (DOJ,
2006). Furthermore, the Department of Homeland Security, along with several other federal
partners, provides additional resources through information systems access, training, and
guidance (DHS, 2017d).
In addition to resources, fusion centers possess enhanced capabilities. They are equipped
to carefully recognize various indicators and warnings. They process and collate information, as
well as analyze and disseminate it, to create intelligence products. They also generate risk
assessments to identify and prioritize vulnerabilities, threats, and consequences at regular
intervals (DOJ, 2008). Their ability to recognize local threats not only impacts local communities
but serves to contribute to a greater national security picture. The centers may potentially
discover vulnerabilities at the local level that may be related to a much larger plot and threat at
the national level (DHS, 2017d).
While fusion centers possess many strengths, one weakness that exists within local fusion
centers is difficulty in constantly ensuring effective teamwork amongst analysts. Fusion centers
must exhibit strong information sharing abilities, yet it can be difficult to accomplish such goals
when analysts often remain isolated at their desks and on their computers, refraining from
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collaborating with one another. Fusion centers must foster continuous collaboration among the
analysts as working together helps to make a connection between cases or potential suspects
quicker, and thus aid in discovering emerging threats sooner.
In addition to strengths and weaknesses, it is important to evaluate external factors of
opportunities and threats that may impact fusion centers. An opportunity that stems from the
environment of fusion centers involves the collaborative efforts of local law enforcement and
federal agencies who provide information to the analysts while working in the field. The goals of
fusion centers could not be accomplished without the input from these partners as they contribute
greatly to the centers through their unique local perspective and skills. Local officers are familiar
with their communities, including the people within them (DHS, 2017a). This allows them to
also build a partnership with the private sector and share their resources in investigations. In
addition, local joint terrorism task force agents’ extensive training, experience, and expertise in
terrorism-related cases aid the centers in better identifying suspicious activity that may lead to
serious, viable threats (DHS, 2016).
A threat, or challenge, that often emanates from the environment of a fusion center is the
lack of effective communication. Fusion centers rely heavily on outside partners to work closely
with the analysts in gathering and sharing information to detect threats. It is difficult, however, to
constantly and consistently communicate with each partner when they have their own
responsibilities. In order to effectively collaborate with outside personnel, the centers need to be
able to continuously communicate with them. If something is not understood, the partners must
be able to verbalize their concerns and work to correct the issue.
Strategic issues. Strategic issues often emanate from unresolved questions within the
organization that require clarification (Ambler, 2017). Addressing these issues and determining
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why they are a challenge allows the organization to then determine how best to fix them. While
there are several methods in analyzing an organization and determining how to identify its
strategic issues, the oval mapping approach is best in identifying the strategic issues of a fusion
center. The oval mapping approach consists of utilizing diagrams to better understand concerns
that may arise throughout the work production of an organization. It encourages using word and
arrow diagrams that include statements on the actions of the organization, how such actions are
performed, and the cause and effect relationship among them (Bryson, 2004).
Based upon the number of partners involved in fusion centers and various duties, tasks,
and responsibilities that each has, the oval mapping approach is more than fitting for analyzing
strategic issues of fusion centers. The diagram can exhibit how the system of a fusion center
functions and how each group collaborates with one another. It can also demonstrate how each
partner exchanges information. Connecting such dots visually will help fusion centers determine
where on the diagrams there may be a concern, especially regarding information sharing
practices.
When visualizing the interaction between local law enforcement personnel, joint
terrorism task force agents, and intelligence analysts, the main strategic issues identified are
communication concerns. For example, differences in security clearances can make it difficult
for the partners to access and share certain information. Strategic issues also emanate from inside
the centers as intelligence analysts may find difficulty in consistently interacting with one
another and fostering teamwork and collaboration. Overcoming these strategic issues of
communication and teamwork is a difficult task but one that is necessary for the centers to
successfully detect and prevent threats.
Performance goals. Goals in a local fusion center must be specific, measurable,
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attainable, responsible, and time specific (Torres, 2014). First and foremost, in order to
strengthen and update partnerships, it is vital to acquire a select group of representatives from
local law enforcement and local joint terrorism task forces that will act as liaisons in the centers.
As a result, it is necessary to develop a liaison selection process. Such a goal includes acquiring,
in approximately one year, roughly 10 representatives from local law enforcement and local joint
terrorism task force personnel. Depending on the size of the locality and fusion center, more
representatives may be acquired, but there should be no more than 25. The representatives are
meant to be a small, select groups of local law enforcement and local joint terrorism task force
personnel that can work closely with the analysts to collect and share intelligence.
While all local law enforcement and local joint terrorism task force personnel are
welcome to apply, there are several required qualities and skills. The applicant must have either a
background in analysis or have previously worked closely with intelligence analysts. They must
demonstrate exceptional interpersonal and leadership skills. They must also be able to multitask.
These skills and qualities will aid greatly in the goals to ease communication between local law
enforcement, homeland security partners, and analysts. These representatives are held to a higher
standard because they will have numerous responsibilities that require effective information
sharing and the ability to act as intermediaries between their groups and the analysts. Lieutenants
and sergeants from law enforcement agencies, supervisors from the terrorism task forces, and
directors of fusion centers will collaborate together to determine who will be selected to act as
liaisons in the centers.
Similar to partnerships, the goals for the standardized training program for fusion center
analysts must also be specific, measurable, attainable, responsible, and time specific. Creating
and implementing the standardized training program for intelligence analysts in fusion centers
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should be completed in approximately two years as it will take time to develop a detailed
program, create a selection process, and apply the program to all fusion centers. Individuals
applying to fusion centers must exhibit skills and capabilities in either analysis or information
technology or have prior experience in such areas. Once hired as analysts, they will undergo the
standardized training.
The training program will be three months and consist of three core components. First,
the analysts will acquire analysis and dissemination skills, learn how to write intelligence
briefings, create graphs and maps, and develop reports that analysts produce daily. Second, they
will develop technological skills that include learning about computer systems and databases.
This involves storing and maintenance of data. The trainees will also learn how to navigate social
media sites efficiently. Lastly, they will study legal regulations in regards to what information
they can and cannot collect in the centers. This will ensure information is gathered lawfully.
Performance indicator. In order to ensure that the strategies of fusion centers are
successful in detecting and preventing threats, the outcomes of the plan must be measured. There
should be several supervisory analysts within the fusion centers who establish performance
metrics to determine if the strategies and actions performed in the centers are effective. They
must gather previous cases where threats were detected and prevented as a result of the work
produced by the centers. They can then analyze the cases, decipher how long it took to first
detect the threat, how long it took to investigate, as well as determine if the threat became viable,
and understand the methods that were used to avert the threat. They also have to analyze the
efforts of each partner, including analysts, local law enforcement personnel, and local FBI joint
terrorism task force agents, to determine what could have been done differently to identify the
threat sooner. Studying past cases allows these analysts to decipher what the issues were, if there
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were any, so that they can be resolved.
Budget and resources. While strategies are vital in improving information sharing, it
would be impossible to implement such plans without the necessary resources and budget. Many
resources for the partnerships between local law enforcement, local joint terrorism task forces,
and analysts currently exist. They each have resources such as databases, various personnel, and
computer systems (DHS, 2018d). The additional resources that are necessary, however, primarily
include work stations and computers in the fusion centers for the liaisons.
For the second part of my strategy in developing standardized training for analysts in
fusion centers, several resources are necessary. It is essential to allocate for the space to train the
individuals for the program as well as obtain resources for core components of the training. This
includes equipment such as smart boards to present lessons, manuals on intelligence and
analysis, computers for the analysts to develop technical skills and navigate various databases,
and legal texts and guidelines regarding the gathering and collection of information.
In order to fund these strategies and resources, fusion centers must gain help from the
federal government. Currently, the federal government provides both resources and funding to
fusion centers to aid in their activities and goals (DHS, 2018c). Specifically, the Department of
Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, and the Department of Justice provide significant resources, training, and services to
fusion centers. Federal agencies also assist in providing grants for various programs and
initiatives for the success of fusion centers and their partners (DHS, 2018d). As a result, local
fusion centers should look towards the federal government to provide significant assistance in
their resources and funding to strengthen partnerships and implement standardized training.
Providing such resources and funding, including grants, allows the strategies to improve
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information sharing. In turn, the centers can continue to grow and advance in their efforts to
effectively share information and better detect and prevent threats.
Effective Communication
Overall, the key to building a successful strategic plan in enhancing information sharing
among local fusion centers is establishing effective communication among analysts, law
enforcement personnel, and homeland security partners. While communication is a vital
component of law enforcement efforts in general, it is especially important to the centers and
their ability to effectively integrate and exchange information. Because the centers act as hubs
that provide for the receipt, gathering, and distribution of information and intelligence, effective
means of communication is essential (DHS, 2017d).
Conclusion
Creating and implementing a strategic proposal requires efficient planning. Such
planning includes being able to effectively analyze fusion centers, determine current issues, and
how best to resolve them. Detailing my two-part strategy of updating partnerships between local
law enforcement, local FBI joint terrorism task forces, and analysts as well as creating and
implementing standardized training for fusion center analysts is necessary in order to develop
and execute such plans. Through my proposal, fusion centers will be able to enhance information
sharing capabilities and ultimately, better detect and disrupt threats to the country.
Chapter 4 involves the United States Constitution and the protections it guarantees to
citizens. It will also address any concerns or issues that may emanate from local fusion centers
and their activities in relation to the fundamental rights granted in the United States Constitution.
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Chapter 4: U.S. Constitution and Ethical Issues
Introduction
By conducting analysis and facilitating information sharing, fusion centers assist law
enforcement partners and homeland security personnel in averting, protecting against, and
responding to both crime and terrorism (DHS, 2017c). While fusion centers serve to detect and
prevent threats, it is also important to ensure that in the process, they abide by the rights of those
they seek to protect. The Constitution of the United States guarantees citizens several rights
(U.S. Const.). While identifying and preventing threats through information sharing practices,
fusion centers must be guided by the Constitution and abide by the rights of citizens.
U.S. Constitution
The Constitution of the United States is a living document that represents independence
and nationhood of the United States of America. Within the Constitution, the Bill of Rights
makes up the first ten amendments that overall limit governmental power and ensure protection
of Americans’ individual liberties (U.S. Const.).
The First Amendment ensures freedom of speech, religion, press, the right to peacefully
assemble, and petition the government for a redress of grievances (U.S. Const. amend. I). The
Second Amendment ensures the right of a well-regulated militia and the right of the people to
keep and bear arms (U.S. Const. amend. II). The Third Amendment explains that no soldier
shall, in a time of peace or war, be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner of
the home (U.S. Const. amend. III). The Fourth Amendment guarantees against unreasonable
searches and seizures. More specifically, it is the right of the people to be secure in their houses,
persons, effects, and papers against unreasonable searches and seizures. If warrants are obtained
they must be based upon probable cause and must clearly describe the place to be searched as
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well as the persons or things to be seized (U.S. Const. amend. IV). The Fifth Amendment
addresses self-incrimination where no person can be held to answer for crimes unless on an
indictment or presentment of a grand jury. It also ensures that no person can be tried twice for
the same crime and that due process protects a person from being deprived of life, liberty, and
property (U.S. Const. amend. V). The Sixth Amendment guarantees a speedy, fair, and public
trial in criminal cases. Every person is entitled to an impartial jury, counsel for their defense, the
right to be informed of the accusations against them, and the right to be confronted with the
witness(s) against them (U.S. Const. amend. VI). The Seventh Amendment ensures the right to
trial by jury in civil cases whereby the facts presented to them can never be reexamined in any
other court in the United States (U.S. Const. amend. VII). The Eighth Amendment protects
against cruel and unusual punishment. It also protects against excessive bail and fines (U.S.
Const. amend. VIII). The Ninth Amendment addresses the enumerated powers and rights in the
Constitution whereby such rights cannot be construed to deny others retained by the people (U.S.
Const. amend. IX). Lastly, the Tenth Amendment explains that the powers that are not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution and that are not prohibited by it to the states are then
given to states, or the people (U.S. Const. amend. X). Additionally, extending liberties to the Bill
of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment includes equal protection of the law and ensures that
individuals are not deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process (U.S. Const. amend.
XIV).
Excluding permissible infringements that apply to many Constitutional rights, it is
important to abide by the rights provided in the United States Constitution as they are there to
protect individual liberties. While there should be efficient law enforcement efforts to ensure
constant protection of the people, it is also vital that in the process of developing such efforts,
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Constitutional rights are not violated. Namely, with information gathering and sharing methods
practiced by local fusion centers, it is important to ensure that the rights of the people are not
being denied in the process. If they are, the information gathering and sharing methods must be
amended to ensure Constitutional rights are protected.
Data collection. Fusion centers gather and share information with law enforcement
partners (DHS, 2017d). When law enforcement agencies collect information on people, however,
there can be several concerns including Constitutional rights of equal protection, freedom of
expression, and privacy. Given the amount of data that local fusion centers gather such concerns
are magnified. The amount of information collected by fusion centers raises concerns that
information may be accessed or stored improperly in databases and that individuals may
potentially be subjected to unwarranted scrutiny based on either innocuous activities or their
religious or political beliefs or racial status (The Constitution Project, 2012). Additionally, as the
centers continue to expand their information collection abilities, there is the potential for
accountability and oversight evasion, data breaches regarding the involvement of the private
sector, and manipulation of data collection and mining processes that may threaten privacy and
negatively impact civil liberties (American Civil Liberties Union, 2019).
Specifically, the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects individuals from
unreasonable searches and allows individuals to be secure in their persons and houses. Warrants
must also be obtained by probable cause (U.S. Const. amend. IV). Suspicious activity reporting
is a concept in which law enforcement personnel and homeland security leaders identify and
share information that is indicative of preoperational planning regarding criminal activity or
terrorism. Fusion centers share these reports with FBI joint terrorism task forces (Nationwide
SAR Initiative, n.d.). Such reports, however, may inadvertently infringe upon individual’s rights
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protected by the Fourth Amendment. Data collection regarding suspicious activity observed by
law enforcement officials could potentially result in the creation of vast databases of information
compiled on individuals without reasonable suspicion that such individuals are actually linked to
criminal activity or terrorism (The Constitution Project, 2012).
In addition to the Fourth Amendment, the First Amendment regarding freedom of speech,
religion, and press may be impacted by fusion centers. The amendment guarantees that
individuals can express themselves freely and as they choose, such as through their religious and
political beliefs. A main concern with fusion centers in relation to the rights provided in the First,
as well as the Fourteenth, Amendment of the Constitution is the potential of profiling. Efforts
taken by fusion centers to monitor, surveil, and share information about individuals may
implicate fundamental Constitutional rights of freedom of speech and religion, as well as
freedom of association and equal protection. Targeting individuals for suspicion based on
characteristics such as political beliefs, religion, or race violates the freedoms granted to
individuals in the U.S. Constitution (The Constitution Project, 2012).
While not explicitly stated, another right that has been inferred and recognized from the
Constitution is the right to privacy. The right to privacy is interpreted in several of the first ten
amendments of the United States Constitution (Right to Privacy, 2017). While fusion centers
serve the purpose of analyzing, disseminating, and sharing threat-related information, some
individuals are concerned that fusion centers can infringe upon privacy rights (DHS, 2017d). As
technology continues to advance, terrorists become smarter and threats become more likely. As a
response, it becomes important for the United States to develop new methods to ensure that
Americans are safe and that threats do not become viable. With these new approaches and
developments, however, privacy concerns can arise as the balance between maintaining security
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of the country and ensuring the right to privacy can be difficult to accomplish.
Particularly, individuals question if fusion centers are lawfully gathering and collecting
information when seeking to detect threats. These concerns emanate due to questions concerning
exactly what information fusion centers are privy to. In order to detect threats, analysts perform
several activities, some of which include researching individuals, as well as their backgrounds,
that may be considered a threat or may be involved in criminal or terrorist activities. For
example, a main tool utilized by fusion centers to identify and share threats includes the SAR
Initiative, or Suspicious Activity Reporting. This suspicious activity reporting initiative is used
by the centers to form a national network for gathering and sharing local law enforcement reports
that include suspicious and potentially terrorism-related activity. As a result, there is a possibility
that the program may infringe upon Constitutional rights of privacy based on the loose definition
of suspicious activity, exactly what information is included in the initiative, and how such
information is obtained (The Constitution Project, 2012).
Solution. While some citizens remain wary that fusion centers can potentially violate
several rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution, measures must be taken to ensure
that fusion centers protect individuals while refraining from violating inalienable rights. This
includes lawfully gathering information that pertains to serious, potential threats. It is also
important to ensure that citizens trust and support fusion centers to keep them safe and keep the
country secure. Although currently there is federal guidance to protect against activities such as
performing unreasonable searches, profiling, and invading privacy when collecting and sharing
data, it is imperative to include more guidance, training, and oversight for fusion center activities
(The Constitution Project, 2012).
In order to overcome challenges involving civil liberties, Part-Two of my strategy
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involves the creation and implementation of standardized training for analysts. By teaching legal
regulations as a core component of the training program, intelligence analysts will know how to
lawfully gather and store information from the very beginning of their careers. Teaching legal
regulations as a core component of the program also assists in information sharing efforts with
local law enforcement and local joint terrorism task forces. Instead of receiving information
gathered unlawfully, law enforcement personnel will receive information that can be used to
build investigations, prosecute offenders, and prevent threats.
Currently, all fusion centers do not operate in the same manner. Since no two fusion
centers are alike regarding information collection regulations and procedures, it is difficult to
make sure that all are following the law and not abusing their powers (American Civil Liberties
Union, 2019). Standardized training, however, ensures uniformity among all fusion centers in
regard to guidelines and practices, helping to ensure that all centers are collecting and gathering
data lawfully, and thus protecting individuals' Constitutional rights.
Legislation
Enacted by Congress as a response to September 11th, the Patriot Act was created to
enforce new tools and methods to detect and prevent terrorism. In order to improve counterterrorism efforts, the legislation permits law enforcement personnel to utilize surveillance against
more crimes of terror, federal agents to follow sophisticated and advanced terrorists trained to
evade detection, law enforcement to conduct investigations without tipping off terrorists, and
federal agents to ask a court for an order to obtain business records in cases of national security
involving terrorism (DOJ, n.d.c).
In addition, the Patriot Act facilitates information sharing, cooperation, and collaboration
among various government agencies in order to better “connect the dots” (DOJ, n.d.c, p. 2). The
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act removed major legal barriers that restrict law enforcement officials, intelligence analysts, and
national defense communities from coordinating their efforts in protecting the American people
and ensuring national security (DOJ, n.d.c).
The Patriot Act also updated the law to reflect new threats and technologies. Under this
component of the act, law enforcement officials are granted the ability to obtain a search warrant
anywhere a terrorist-related activity takes place and victims of computer hacking are allowed to
request assistance from law enforcement in monitoring the “trespassers” (DOJ, n.d.c, p. 2) on
their computers. Lastly, the act increased the penalties for those who commit acts of terror. This
includes prohibiting the harboring of terrorists, enhancing the maximum penalties for different
crimes that are likely to be committed by terrorists, enhancing several conspiracy penalties,
punishing terrorist attacks on mass transit systems, punishing bioterrorists, and eliminating the
statutes of limitations for certain terrorist crimes as well as lengthening them for others (DOJ,
n.d.c).
These tools and activities are beneficial to fusion centers as they provide them with better
resources and abilities to identify and investigate terrorism-related threats. Similar to the
Information Sharing Environment developed by the Department of Homeland Security to
support the sharing of information between law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and the
private sector, the Patriot Act enforces information sharing to better identify acts of terrorism
before they occur (Hodai, 2013).
Conclusion
While the goal of local fusion centers is to protect citizens and keep the country secure, it
is imperative that individuals’ Constitutional rights are protected. As technology advances and
threats become more serious, the balance between ensuring security and guaranteeing
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Constitutional rights becomes difficult to maintain. Nonetheless, America is a country founded
on the principals and rights provided in the United States Constitution. When developing
strategies to ensure safety for the people and security for the country, measures must be taken to
ensure that Constitutional rights are not violated. By keeping Constitutional rights in mind while
developing information gathering and sharing practices, fusion centers can accomplish their
goals in providing safety for the public while still protecting individuals’ fundamental rights.
In Chapter 5, policy analysis of fusion centers will be discussed. It will identify the
problems of the centers so that they can be addressed and resolved through policy formulation,
policy adoption, policy implementation, and policy evaluation.
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Chapter 5: Policy Analysis and Evaluation
Introduction
In order to ensure that the proposed strategy for improving information sharing among
fusion centers is effective, an evaluation must be completed on the program. Specifically, an
outcome evaluation will assess the program’s performance and effectiveness in reaching its goals.
The planning and design of the evaluation will be conducted based upon a measurement system of
success that will guide the assessment of the program’s outcomes.
To analyze the program effectively, several fusion centers that provide information sharing
and analysis for major urban areas must be randomly chosen and evaluated as samples. Data on
the centers must be collected and an evaluation design must be determined. Additionally, a cost
benefit analysis of the program will be conducted. Overall, the planned evaluation will assist in
determining the effectiveness of local fusion centers.
Evaluation questions. By understanding the operations of fusion centers, their goals and
objectives, and metrics of success, the evaluation will provide insight into the overall
effectiveness of my strategy for fusion centers and their information sharing practices. It is also
important for the evaluation to address existing issues in fusion centers and determine if the new
strategies can fix those concerns. Several questions must be asked when performing the
evaluation on local fusion centers. The questions include:
•

What are the goals and objectives of local fusion centers?

•

What are the metrics of success for a fusion center?

•

Are collaborative efforts between the analysts and law enforcement partners
establishing seamless information sharing?
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•

Does the standardized training program enhance intelligence analysts’ skills and
capabilities in analysis and dissemination? Does it establish uniformity among all
fusion centers regarding information sharing policies and procedures?

•

Has the center improved in its efforts to consistently share information?

•

Has the center improved its ability to detect, investigate, and prevent threats in a
timely manner?

Policy Analysis Definition/Literature Review
In order to develop an evaluation system for fusion centers, it is necessary to gain insight
from previous research on fusion centers and their performance as information sharing hubs.
Reviewing past incidents involving work produced by the centers will aid in gathering
information from their efforts, productivity, and overall effectiveness. It also helps to acquire
information on past failures or successes of the centers and what factors may have attributed to
those results.
Theoretical framework. Fusion centers currently operate with intelligence analysts and
several different law enforcement and homeland security partners (Devine, 2014). A
standardized training program for fusion center analysts has not yet been created, implemented,
or utilized in fusion centers. While a standardized training program has not yet been
implemented and does not appear in previous research, fusion centers analysts are required to
exhibit certain qualities that ensure they can perform their responsibilities in disseminating
intelligence and creating analytic products for investigators.
Previous research on the effectiveness of fusion centers and their information sharing
practices yields differing results. Opponents of the centers recognize the massive funds that are
allocated to the centers. Additionally, some scholars and government officials remain concerned
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that the centers lack productivity and only generate a small number of analytic products related
to terrorism. Many scholars have conducted research regarding inefficiencies and failures of
local fusion centers. They discovered that the centers have failed to utilize the information
available to them to detect terroristic plots in their respective locality. The researchers state that
there is a lack of focus on the specific community needs and local crimes in the fusion center’s
local area. Research also shows that their tactical, rather than strategic, nature inhibits their
efforts to gather and analyze intelligence that results in long-term benefits for national security.
A few case studies have even shown that the centers hinder federal counterterrorism efforts as
opposed to supporting them. A lack of continuity among the centers and their partners also
negatively impacts their work productivity. Finally, a lack of metrics for measuring successes, or
failures, stems from the absence of federal guidelines and policies for the centers (Devine, 2014).
While the effectiveness of fusion centers has been in question by some scholars and
government officials, there are also notable examples in which the facilities have greatly assisted
in disrupting criminal activity and preventing terrorists’ plots. Some instances whereby the
centers have experienced notable successes include assisting in sex trafficking related arrests
(DHS, 2015c), disrupting a synthetic drug ring, and combatting transnational drug networks
(DHS, 2015d). They have also been involved in providing support to active shooter, money
laundering, and homicide investigations (DHS, 2015e).
Additionally, there have been several instances in which state and local fusion centers
played crucial roles in the identification, analysis, and dissemination of information in terroristic
plots which led to arrests and prevention of large scale attacks on U.S. soil. Law enforcement
collaborated with the centers to terminate a plan to detonate explosives on September 11th, 2009
in the New York City subway system. Additionally, intelligence developed by a fusion center in

50
INFORMATION SHARING: LOCAL FUSION CENTERS
Massachusetts contributed to the prevention of a terrorist attack in 2011 on the Capitol building
and the Pentagon in Washington D.C. that involved airplanes packed with C-4 plastic explosives
(Devine, 2014). In 2012, fusion centers were recognized as the “Most Notable Law Enforcement
Interdiction, Arrest or Counter-Terrorism Program” (DHS, 2015e, p. 2). In addition to
apprehending criminals and preventing criminal and terrorist activity, the centers have aided in
saving lives and avoiding noteworthy physical damages and costs (Devine, 2014).
Specific needs to be met by the program. Without an evaluation, it would be
impossible to analyze the performance and effectiveness of fusion centers. The evaluation
measures the performances of the centers according to their objectives and what they seek to
achieve. Thus, in order to be considered successful at the end of the evaluation, the centers must
be measured on specific standards that they must meet as information sharing hubs. This
includes identifying imminent and emerging threats as they are made, connecting the dots in
investigations through constant communication with partners, informing partners of developing
information, producing accurate and timely intelligence, and recognizing the national threat
picture. It also entails apprehending suspects, coordinating operations to investigate the threat,
and collaborating to mitigate and prevent criminal and terrorist activity.
Goals and objectives of the program. Fusion centers have several different goals and
objectives. The main objective of fusion centers is to facilitate information sharing among
various partners. A recognized need to fill a communication gap after 9/11 led to the importance
of the centers and their abilities to practice effective information sharing methods. The goal is to
provide a mechanism where all law enforcement, public safety, and even private sector partners
at times, can share threat-related information. The objective of fusion centers is to maximize the
centers’ abilities to detect, disrupt, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity
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(DHS, 2017c). By integrating information sharing in a coherent and efficient manner, fusion
centers can better provide for the safety of citizens and security of the nation.
Target population. In an evaluation of a program, the target population is the primary
group of people that a product or service is aimed at (Newcomer, Hatry, & Wholey, 2015). With
fusion centers, the target population consists of several groups. First and foremost, the centers
serve the public. They are facilities that support both the safety of the people and security of the
nation. In addition to the public, the target population consists of intelligence analysts, local law
enforcement personnel, and local joint terrorism task force agents. These different groups are
considered the target population because they are greatly impacted by the new strategies being
implemented in the fusion centers. It is not only important to ensure that the public sees the
benefits of the new strategies, but it is also essential for the analysts, local law enforcement
personnel, and task force agents to want to partake in the new procedures as well.
Policy Evaluation
An evaluation design consists of developing the best possible approaches to take when
analyzing the strategies of the program. The evaluation of fusion centers must be developed by
analyzing a few, select centers. These centers will be samples to test as they will allow the
evaluators to determine whether the implemented strategies have influenced successful
performances of the facilities. The evaluation design is comprised of the inputs, processes, and
outcomes of fusion centers. It also entails what factors, such as data collection methods and
evaluation instruments, will be included in developing the evaluation design and analyzing the
program. Lastly, the evaluation must include any potential problems that may result from the
program or evaluation itself as it is important to generate accurate findings.
The inter-rater reliability evaluation design measures consistency among raters evaluating
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performances of a program. It includes measurements of the extent to which data collectors, or
raters, assign the same score to the same variable in a study. Consisting of individuals who are
educated on the operations of fusion centers, the inter-rater reliability evaluation design will only
be utilized to ensure consistency among the raters measuring the uniformity of fusion centers’
processes and performances. The inter-rater reliability method will be used to determine if these
educated raters can achieve a high level of agreement on the performances of the fusion centers
and if my strategy contributed to successful outcomes (McHugh, 2012).
Evaluation instruments. In order to complete the evaluation process so that the raters
can adequately measure the performance of the centers, the variables of the centers must be
analyzed. Some variables to consider when evaluating the effect of my strategy on fusion centers
should include the specific methods utilized to detect the emerging threat, if detected at all, the
applied processes in transferring the information from one partner to the next, and the time frame
of investigations. Similarly, certain criteria regarding the performance of the centers must be
met. The factors attributing to success will help to evaluate the centers and their efficiency and
effectiveness as a program. In order to determine if fusion centers are successful, the following
criteria will be used:
•

Detection or identification of emerging threat before it becomes viable (i.e. before
a terrorist attack is executed)

•

Information passed to other partners in a timely fashion (i.e. as soon as a viable
lead persists)

•

Weekly production and distribution of intelligence or tactical products to other
agencies (DHS, 2018e)
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•

Weekly leads vetted by the centers that result in the enhancement or initiation of
an investigation (DHS, 2018e)

•

Apprehension of suspects as a result of efforts made by fusion centers and their
law enforcement partners

•

Prevention of widespread criminal or terrorist acts

Research methods. Gathering useful information for the evaluation of fusion centers can
be accomplished through the process of raters by trained observers. Trained observers are
individuals who typically have experience in the subject at hand and thus can provide valuable
insight on the effectiveness of fusion centers, along with what may or may not be working with
them. Such individuals already have several related skills necessary to understand the program
and what would make it successful. This data collection method relies on either volunteer efforts
or the use of existing personnel. The raters must collect data on the center’s primary mission, the
quality of analytic products generated, and prior success stories. Raters by trained observers is
also a relatively low-cost data collection effort (Newcomer et al., 2015).
Additionally, focus group interviews are another data collection method that can be
useful in evaluating fusion centers. Used as a research strategy in gathering information, focus
groups are often conducted by a moderator who guides a small group of individuals in answering
a set of carefully sequenced questions. The groups allow for more of a conversation where the
study participants do not have to reach agreements, but rather provide their insight on the
program based on the questions that they are given. The questions continue to hone in on the
specific topic more and more, allowing for detailed answers as the interview continues. Such
questions help the moderator gain valuable feedback and insight on the program (Newcomer et
al., 2015).
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The groups participating in the interviews would consist of stakeholders such as
intelligence analysts, local law enforcement, and joint terrorism task force personnel as they are
all involved in the information sharing processes of the centers and can provide valuable
feedback. The benefit of focus groups is that they are not only useful in the evaluation phase of a
program but also in the implementation and design phase. These focus groups can help an
agency or program identify key factors that need to be addressed or fixed, and how to do so, in
order to improve the value and effectiveness of the program (Newcomer et al., 2015).
Cost benefit-analysis. A cost benefit-analysis (CBA) is an effective program evaluation.
CBA is most useful when analyzing a program in order to determine whether its total benefits to
society exceed its costs. The negative impacts of the program would be considered costs while
positive impacts of the program are counted as benefits (Newcomer et al., 2015). Some costs of
fusion centers may include concern for privacy rights or authority figures overstepping their
boundaries. In addition, there are monetary costs for items such as computers, information
technology equipment, and training guides, as well as personnel such as trainers hired for the
standardized training program for analysts. On the other hand, there are numerous benefits to
fusion enters. Fusion centers serve all of society by protecting them from the threats that they
detect and disrupt. Benefits of the centers would include better communication and uniformity
regarding regulations and practices among the fusion centers. Additionally, the facilities protect
communities, provide situational awareness, inform important decisions, and enhance
information sharing among law enforcement and homeland security partners (DHS, 2015b).
Their overall benefits involve protecting society and keeping them safe from criminal or terrorist
activity.
Limitations. A concern to address regarding the evaluation is how to proceed with the
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findings of the study, especially if they render undesirable results. If the study results in
problems of efficiency, it will certainly be a concern for the progress of fusion centers. Questions
regarding what can be changed or altered to potentially create a beneficial program for fusion
centers and how would that plan be implemented will arise. In addition, since many program
evaluations are published online for public view, there may be backlash if the results of the
evaluation indicate problems of efficiency. In cases like this, the evaluation can still be
published, but it is essential to detail why such results may have happened. This is important
because it can help to address what factors or details of the program may need to be fixed in
order for the program to be effective. There is the potential for the public to gather an
understanding of the program, the goals it seeks to acquire, and the hope that new strategies can
be formed to achieve those goals.
Conclusion
In order to ensure successful outcomes, the performances of local fusion centers and the
impact of my strategy must be evaluated. An efficient evaluation design, along with research and
data collection on the centers, will provide insight into the operations of the centers and their
abilities as information sharing hubs. Specifically, the inter-rater reliability evaluation design as
well as data collection methods including raters by trained observers and focus group interviews
will aid in completing a valid and efficient evaluation method to properly assess the effectiveness
of the centers.
Chapter 6 will continue to address the development of my strategy regarding information
sharing for fusion centers, but it will do so for a different country. Chapter 6 will assess my
proposed strategy for one of America’s allies in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia.
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Chapter 6: Comparative Governments
Introduction
The fight against terrorism is a constant battle faced by many nations. The threat to the
security of various countries, as well as the safety of the people within them, continues to rise as
terrorists become more sophisticated in their plans and methods of attack. Due to the rather high
concern of terrorism in the 21st century, it is essential for nations to develop tactics and strategies
to combat terrorism and ensure national security.
The United States has developed several counterterrorism tactics to build its national
security against threats of terrorism. One of the primary methods that the United States has
utilized to combat terrorism is the expanded use of intelligence and information sharing through
fusion centers. Serving as the primary focal points with local and state environments for the
receipt, gathering, analysis, and sharing of threat-related information among local, tribal,
territorial, state, and federal partners, fusion centers had previously identified, investigated, and
thwarted serious threats, both criminal and terrorist, to the country (DHS, 2017c) (DHS, 2015f).
In addition to implementing counterterrorism measures through the use of fusion centers,
the United States collaborates with other nations to combat terrorism. A prominent partner of the
U.S. and their efforts to combat terrorism is Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia cooperates with the U.S.
to strengthen their efforts to avert terrorist attacks and threats that greatly impact their nation.
Just as the U.S. has enhanced its national security through the implementation of fusion centers,
Saudi Arabia, too, can benefit from creating and implementing fusion centers in their nation. In
turn, Saudi Arabia will be better prepared to defend itself against terrorist activity. The global
perspective of terrorism in Saudi Arabia, their current counterterrorism efforts, and a proposed
counterterrorism strategy will be addressed in order to heighten Saudi Arabia’s national security.
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Global Perspective on Terrorism
One of the primary terrorist threats that Saudi Arabia faces is from ISIS, also known as
Daesh and ISIL. Saudi Arabia is one the main targets of ISIS because it is both the birthplace of
Islam as well as home to the Two Holy Mosques. ISIS often targets Saudi Arabia because they
perceive the Saudi Arabian government to be un-Islamic and an enemy of theirs that is too
closely associated with the West. In the past, ISIS has both inspired and launched lethal attacks
in Saudi Arabia that primarily targeted Saudi security forces and Shia residents. Despite several
efforts from Saudi Arabia to identify and prevent terrorist attacks, ISIS-affiliated groups were
able to plan and execute several attacks to their nation (Department of State, n.d.).
In addition to ISIS, other threats to Saudi Arabia stem from al-Qaeda. Threats from both
ISIS and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula continue as both groups encourage individual acts of
terrorism. In total, Saudi Arabia has faced more than 60 terrorist attacks by both ISIS and alQaeda, resulting in more than 200 deaths of both citizens and police officers. In addition to their
attacks, ISIS continues to recruit and present their missions, ideologies, and activities on social
media networks. This use of social media in recruitment has continued to increase significantly
over time (Saudi Arabia & Counterterrorism Fact Sheet, 2017).
Impact of terrorism. According to the country reports on terrorism, a total of 34 terrorist
attacks occurred in Saudi Arabia in 2016, most of which included suicide bombers. On January
29th 2016, a suicide bomb attack occurred at a mosque in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia
by a 22-year-old Saudi national. Because of the attack, four worshippers were killed.
Additionally, on July 4th 2016, coordinated bombings occurred in three cities across Saudi
Arabia. One suicide bomber wounded two security officers after striking near the U.S. Consulate
General in Jeddah. Another attack took place on a security post near the Prophet’s Mosque in
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Medina in which four guards were killed in the process. The third attack occurred near a Shia
mosque in the Eastern Province city of Qatif. In this attack, only the bomber was killed. In
addition to the attacks themselves, terrorism financing can greatly impact the nation and lead to
the execution of the attacks. While Saudi Arabia has sought to maintain supervision of the
banking sector and strengthen penalties for financing terrorism, there are still allegations that
funds are collected in secret and then illicitly transferred out of the country in cash (Department
of State, n.d.).
Organized crime and conflict. Along with terrorism, organized crime plays a significant
role in the threats against Saudi Arabia and their stability as a nation. The smuggling of narcotics
continues to be a challenge along the border areas. Additionally, the threat of kidnappings by
terrorist groups remains as a potential concern as terrorist organizations may begin to resort to
targeting individuals rather than carrying out widespread, large-scale attacks. Saudi Arabia has
also experienced some cyber threats in recent years. In 2012, Saudi Aramco, Saudi’s oil
company, fell victim to one of the first, well-documented cyber-attacks that occurred in the Gulf.
Other cyber-attacks that happened in 2016 have impacted both the civil aviation and
transportation agencies (Saudi Arabia & Counterterrorism April, 2017).
Furthermore, beggars who often work on the streets in Saudi Arabia attempt to raise
money and funds for criminal and terrorist activities as they have links to both criminal and
terrorist groups that operate both in the Kingdom and abroad. The individuals committing these
crimes are largely illegal workers who may have outstayed their Haj and Umrah visas in the
country. While the beggars continue to acquire funds in support of their links to the criminal and
terrorist groups by begging for donations, studies are showing that many are also seeking to
obtain money through social media. Often beggars will provide a bank account on social media
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for any individuals who choose to donate. Such practices seem to be appearing more and are
potential threats in regard to terrorism financing and funding in Saudi Arabia. While Saudi
Arabia has begun to recognize the threats, inform the public of their plans, and work towards
preventing the beggars from acquiring funds, it is essential that these acts are prevented
altogether. Providing funds for terrorists is one of the main factors that allows them to carry out
their acts of terrorism in the first place (Beggars, 2015).
As often seen in various areas in the Middle East, ongoing regional conflict could
potentially affect national security for Saudi Arabia. The instability in Iraq and the war in Yemen
consistently produce numerous fights and attacks on both the northern and southern borders of
Saudi Arabia. Yemen’s Houthi militia has launched multiple SCUD missiles into Saudi Arabia.
These attacks resulted in severe damage to the land and loss of life of the Saudi people. The
combination of the violence that occurs within miles of the border with Yemen as well as an
increase in illegal immigration and smuggling from the southern border contributes to a very real
threat to Saudi Arabia and its safety and security (Department of State, 2017a).
International Counter-Terrorism Strategies
In 2016, despite the attacks that took place, Saudi Arabia developed initiatives and
counterterrorism measures to prevent further incidents. As a result of their efforts, they arrested
several terrorist suspects, disrupted active terrorist cells all across the Kingdom, and reinforced
their capacity to combat violent extremist ideologies. They also heightened their law
enforcement and intelligence efforts in the fight against terrorism (Department of State, n.d.).
Role of law enforcement. Law enforcement officials in Saudi Arabia frequently work
directly with the community. They include large numbers of high-profile uniformed and plainclothed officers who work openly and covertly throughout communities (Department of State,
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2017a). Neighborhood police units seek to work with the community in order to encourage
citizens to provide information about suspected terrorist activity. Law enforcement authorities
also focus highly on preventing terrorism financing. They impose financial sanctions regarding
terrorism funding to deter offenders from providing money to terrorists and essentially aiding in
their plans of execution. Such sanctions are imposed on any individuals or entities who act on
behalf of or provide support for terrorist groups including, but not limited to, Hizballah,
al‑Qa’ida (AQ), Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LeT), and the Taliban (Department of State, n.d.).
Role of intelligence. When first recognizing the need for intelligence, Saudi Arabia
sought to build facilities that could provide information for decision makers and participate with
other security services. As a result, Saudi Arabia set up an intelligence service beginning with
the opening of an office for intelligence in the year 1376 Hijra, corresponding to 1955, under the
name of “Al-Mabahith Al-Aammah,” or General Investigations (Saudi Secret Service, 20002019). Over time intelligence continued to expand as a valuable source of security and the
General Intelligence Presidency became the primary intelligence agency in Saudi Arabia today
(Saudi Intelligence Agencies, 2017).
The General Intelligence Presidency (GIP) is tasked with ensuring national security
through information analysis. The center reports back to the King of Saudi Arabia providing him
with valuable information, assessments, and strategic evaluations. The center is highly important
to the country as it is the most accredited advisor to the ruler, giving him insight on potential
threats and how best to mitigate them. The GIP consists of several personnel and offices within
the center. This includes an Inspector General for protocol, an office for External Relations, and
an office for the Presidency. Over time, the Presidency continued to expand and experience
numerous developments. They opened offices abroad and set up local branches to cover various
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areas of Saudi Arabia. Such branches comprise the Department for Financial and Administrative
Affairs, the Department for Communications and Tapping, a Training and Planning Department,
a Technical Department, an Operations Department, and an Analysis Department that is subdivided into different themes such as politics and terrorism. The Director of the GIP is also
supported by a deputy. Additionally, the Presidency was reorganized to include qualified
personnel with unique expertise in intelligence and national security. The personnel began to
undergo training courses in areas such as computer science in order to develop skills for their
work and develop their capabilities in technology (Saudi Secret Service, 2000-2019).
The GIP runs both strategic and counter intelligence operations. The center coordinates
information collection and intelligence production practices, plans the activities of national
intelligence services, and carries out research and studies. They present their findings to decision
makers to draw up both internal and external policies built on the intelligence that the Presidency
produces. The center also establishes mutual relations with security services of other countries
that are considered to be their allies as they preside over the bilateral relationship with outside,
foreign intelligence agencies (Saudi Secret Service, 2000-2019) (Saudi Intelligence Agencies,
2017).
While the GIP remains as the most prominent intelligence agency, Saudi Arabia
maintains other agencies that make up their intelligence community. They comprise of the
National Guard, the Ministry of Defense and Aviation, the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of Defense and Aviation retains its own Information and
Security department and is tasked with focusing on policing and military intelligence. The
Ministry of Interior has its own domestic intelligence agency that remains in charge of the fight
against terrorism in Saudi Arabia and lastly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acts as the
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intermediary between Saudi Arabia and foreign intelligence agencies. It provides both analysis
and evaluations on regional affairs. These centers, just as the GIP, report back to the King of
Saudi Arabia. The King essentially remains as the Commander in Chief, presiding over these
organizations (Saudi Intelligence Agencies, 2017).
Coordination from an international multifaceted approach. In recent years, Saudi
Arabia has become one of the leading nations in seeking to combat terrorism and terrorism
financing. Saudi Arabia has acknowledged the importance of counterterrorism strategies and in
2014 issued a royal decree on it. The decree on counterterrorism reinforced that acts of terrorism,
terrorist organizations, recruitment through social media, and participation in terrorist activity
will not be tolerated. Often, the Kingdom presents public education campaigns to discredit the
terrorists and condemn their activities. They also monitor their mosques in order to prevent
political or religious incitement. In addition to removing any preachers who may advocate for
radical ideologies, they send these preachers through programs to re-educate them and rid them
of their radical ideologies. Saudi Arabia also works with individuals who are affected by terrorist
recruitment and messages by placing them in de-radicalization programs (Saudi Arabia &
Counterterrorism Fact Sheet, 2017).
Saudi Arabia retains close ties with international communities. They are members of the
Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, co-leaders of the Counter ISIS Finance Group (CIFG), and a
founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum. Saudi security professionals continue
to participate in various joint programs around the world in order to build counterterrorism
tactics. In December of 2015, they established the Saudi-led Islamic Military Alliance to Fight
Terrorism where representatives from a total of 39 different countries attended in order to focus
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on discussing financial, ideological, military, and media aspects of counterterrorism measures
(Department of State, n.d.).
One of the main countries that Saudi Arabia cooperates and collaborates with is the
United States. They maintain a strong counterterrorism relationship with the United States and
look to them for assistance, if necessary, especially since the Middle East tends to experience a
vast amount of terrorist attacks. Overall, however, the relationship is mutual in that both
countries view each other as allies and seek to work together to combat terrorism. For example,
while the United States has supported Saudi Arabia through restraining Iranian conduct, Saudi
Arabia has also aided the States by influencing the modeling of United States’ counterradicalization programs after their own approach (Saudi Arabia & Counterterrorism April, 2017).
In order to ensure the safety of both the Saudi and U.S. citizens within Saudi Arabian
territories and abroad, the countries have continued to strengthen their collaborative efforts in the
past couple of years. First and foremost, both countries combat terrorism through the joint
military and finance task forces that are operated by the two countries. They work closely
together to track and close down illicit money-transfer centers that would otherwise allow the
terrorists to carry out their plans. Together they strive to defeat Daesh, Al Qaeda, and Iraniansponsored extremism and expansionism. By sharing information, the United States and Saudi
Arabia cooperate with each other in seeking to shut down the funds from western banks to
Middle Eastern extremists that finance the terrorists’ activities. Saudi Arabia has even developed
“fusion cells” where certain partners, namely Saudi Arabian intelligence officials and law
enforcement personnel from the U.S., can work together to investigate and interdict both
terrorism plots and finances (Saudi Arabia & Counterterrorism April, 2017).
Human Rights Concerns
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Similar to human rights guaranteed to individuals in the United States, the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia contains laws that prohibit “unlawful intrusions into the privacy of persons, their
homes, places of work, and vehicles” (Department of State, 2017b, p. 20). Law enforcement
officials are required to follow certain precautions such as providing search warrants and
maintaining records of searches that are conducted on individuals. Based upon such regulations,
human rights of privacy apply to Saudi Arabia as they do in America. Intelligence facilities in
Saudi Arabia must refrain from overstepping their authority when collecting and sharing data on
individuals so that they do not infringe upon privacy rights (Department of State, 2017b).
Proposed Counter-Terrorism Strategy
Although Saudi Arabia has strengthened their counterterrorism efforts through the
development of their intelligence facilities, they have yet to advance the General Intelligence
Presidency into a fusion center as the United States has. Once the country transforms their main
intelligence center, the GIP, into a fusion center, they can then expand their implementation of
fusion centers into several intelligence facilities in the nation.
Creation of fusion center. While the GIP in Saudi Arabia exhibits several unique
capabilities that allow the center to be a useful tool to national security, Saudi Arabia can
certainly benefit from taking the intelligence center and transforming it into a fusion center. In
fact, Saudi Arabia seems to be moving in such a direction as they have already established
“fusion cells” where intelligence officials and law enforcement personnel, as well as officials
from other countries, work together to investigate terrorism plots and financing (Saudi Arabia &
Counterterrorism April, 2017). Nonetheless, transforming the General Intelligence Presidency
into a fusion center that exhibits unique information sharing capabilities to detect and prevent
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threats will enhance Saudi Arabia’s ability to protect their people and ensure their national
security.
Two-part strategy. First and foremost, in order to transform Saudi Arabia’s General
Intelligence Presidency into a fusion center, numerous connections with law enforcement
partners must be created and maintained. This entails acquiring police officers to work side by
side the intelligence analysts in the office of the General Intelligence Presidency. It is essential
for law enforcement personnel and intelligence analysts to work together to develop partnerships
for the seamless flow of information sharing. When the officers and analysts can share
information more seamlessly, they have a higher chance of identifying connections between
cases or suspects that may be a high threat to the nation. While there will be a select amount of
law enforcement officials in the center to support the analysts and vice versa, they will also
provide the analysts with information from officers who remain on the streets and directly
converse with the community.
In order to ensure that analysts and law enforcement officers cooperate effectively, there
should also be collaborative meetings with partners. National meetings with the intelligence
community, government officials, and law enforcement officers must be held monthly. This will
help to retain constant communication and cooperation in Saudi Arabia’s counterterrorism
efforts. These collaborative, intelligence meetings should entail potential threats to be aware of
as well as areas of concern where there may need to be an increase in law enforcement presence.
The meetings must also encourage feedback from those attending. Participation is essential in
gathering information on how best to proceed with keeping the communities safe and
establishing security against terrorism in Saudi Arabia.
Once the GIP is developed into a fusion center to enhance information sharing practices,
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a standardized training program for the intelligence analysts in the center must be developed.
Because intelligence analysts collect information and transform it into valuable intelligence, they
also have the responsibility of informing decision makers, such as the King of Saudi Arabia, on
potential threats facing the country (DHS, 2017c). As a result of their duties in informing
decision makers, they must be able to produce both accurate and timely intelligence.
Additionally, because Saudi Arabia and the U.S. often collaborate with one another and share
intelligence for counterterrorism purposes, it is valuable for intelligence analysts in Saudi Arabia
to undergo similar training requirements as analysts in the U.S. in order to retain similar skills
and learn similar procedures for gathering and sharing intelligence (Department of State, n.d.).
To ensure analysts retain the skills necessary from the training program, the program
must consist of three months so that they have sufficient time to learn protocols on information
gathering, analytic product development, and intelligence sharing. Throughout the program,
analysts must focus on three categories of expertise for their role as intelligence analysts
defending the national security of Saudi Arabia. First, they must develop expertise in analysis
and the development of intelligence briefings, maps, charts, graphs, and threat assessments.
Second, analysts must be trained in information technology. Not only does an analyst have to be
tech savvy to perform their everyday duties, but as cyber terrorism becomes more prevalent in
the 21st century, analysts must also enhance their technological skills. Such sub-categories should
include learning about security measures, databases, and how to both store and maintain valuable
information. Third, the training program must contain certain protocols and procedures for
analysts to follow when serious threats are detected. The system must consist of the steps to take
in preventing the threat and how best to inform decision makers. This also includes knowing the
laws of Saudi Arabia to avoid infringing upon privacy rights.
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Transforming the General Intelligence Presidency of Saudi Arabia into a fusion center
will significantly enhance both the safety and security of the nation. The fusion center will not
only provide for valuable intelligence but it will encourage and produce effective information
sharing. Fostering information sharing is essential in detecting threats, developing leads,
apprehending suspects, and preventing threats before they become viable. In this process, the
fusion center will become a valuable asset to the government, law enforcement officials, and the
general public of Saudi Arabia seeking to remain safe and defend their national security.
Conclusion
While Saudi Arabia has certainly made progress in their counterterrorism efforts in the
past several years, the threat of terrorism is always expanding. As terrorists become smarter and
more sophisticated in their plans of attack, it is essential that Saudi Arabia develops new
procedures to enhance their efforts to combat terrorism. As terrorism has greatly impacted their
country, Saudi Arabia has recognized the value in collaborating internationally, namely with the
United States as an ally and supporter in preventing terrorism. Just as the development of fusion
centers and information sharing capabilities has assisted in detecting and preventing acts of
terrorism in the U.S., it can foster similar results for Saudi Arabia. The creation of a fusion center
in Saudi Arabia will allow for advanced partnerships and communication efforts between
intelligence analysts and law enforcement officials, thus producing seamless information sharing.
In addition, it will heighten the abilities of the intelligence analysts to detect threats, analyze
information, and produce valuable and efficient intelligence for the Saudi Arabian government.
By generating a fusion center based on those already developed in the United States and
implementing these strategies, Saudi Arabia will enhance their safety for the public and national
security against any and all criminal and terrorist threats.
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In the next chapter, Chapter 7, international human rights will be discussed. More
specifically, the development of fusion centers in the United States, their information sharing
strategies, and their connection to international human rights will be analyzed.
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Chapter 7: International Human Rights
Introduction
While developing and improving information sharing capabilities for local fusion centers
is beneficial in detecting and preventing threats, it is essential to consider its impact on
international human rights. Human rights include rights that are inherent to all human beings.
Regardless of any sex, race, ethnicity, religion, or other status, human beings are born free and
equal in rights and dignity. The right to life, liberty and security of person are a few rights that
are innate to each human being (United Nations, n.d.). Because these rights are innate, it is
crucial that the strategies developed to enhance information sharing capabilities among fusion
centers do not infringe upon international human rights. By taking precautionary measures to
safeguard rights while developing information gathering and sharing methods for fusion centers,
the centers can maintain security for the public and protect human rights.
Theoretical Understanding and International Policies
Both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights are international laws that detail several rights that are universally protected.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights promotes the strengthening of respect for all
fundamental freedoms and human rights. Some rights include a fair and public hearing by an
impartial tribunal, protection against any arbitrary arrests or cruel punishments, and the right to
recognition everywhere as an individual before the law. Additionally, the law explains that no
one may be subjected to any arbitrary interference with their privacy, home, or family, nor
experience any attacks upon their reputation. It also states that all people are entitled to equal
protection against any form of discrimination. The declaration endorses understanding and
tolerance among all nations and religious or racial groups for the maintenance of peace (United
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Nations, n.d.).
Similarly, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes the inherent dignity and
inalienable rights of all individuals as well as supports and defends human being’s political
freedoms and economic, social, and cultural rights. Rights incorporated in the covenant include
equality before the law, freedom of opinion and expression, and protection of minority rights. It
also prohibits arbitrary interference with privacy as well as discrimination and advocacy of both
racial or religious hatred (United Nations, 1996-2019).
Human rights and fusion centers. Prominent concepts in human rights include freedom
from interference with privacy, equality before the law, and freedom from discrimination (United
Nations, n.d.). Not only are these rights fundamental human rights guaranteed to all, but they
relate greatly to fusion centers and some concerns for their activities. While local fusion centers
intend to protect individuals through information sharing practices to detect and prevent threats,
they have to ensure that in the process they do not violate privacy and equality rights.
Freedom from interference with privacy. Privacy is a recognized human right that
guarantees freedom from government interference. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
explains that no individual can be subjected to arbitrary interference with their privacy, home,
correspondence, or family. Additionally, they cannot be subjected to attacks on their reputation
(United Nations, n.d.). While individuals are protected against such interference, many question
fusion centers’ activities in regard to privacy rights and how much the government may be
interfering in their personal lives. As fusion centers integrate and analyze information and
intelligence, the apprehension is that the adoption of such proactive approaches in collecting
information intrudes upon individuals’ privacy (Masse et al., 2007).
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Equality before the law. Additionally, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states
that all individuals are equal before the law and receive equal protection under it. Thus, they
cannot be discriminated against in any way (United Nations, n.d.). When gathering information
and intelligence in fusion centers, it is important that religious, racial, or political profiling does
not influence data collection. Due to the amount of data that the centers aggregate, there are
concerns that individuals may be subjected to unjustified scrutiny based on innocuous activities,
their religious or political beliefs, or racial status (The Constitution Project, 2012).
National Security and Human Rights
When developing strategies for homeland security, there is often a difficult balance
between the implementation of public safety strategies and sustaining human rights. The
difficulty lies in balancing the protection of innate human rights that are guaranteed to everyone
and ensuring safety and security for those same individuals. Not only can my strategy raise some
concerns about fusion centers’ activities in relation to violating privacy rights or profiling certain
individuals, but sharing such information may cause problems for the relationship between
fusion centers and the public (DOJ, 2010b). It can lead to distrust and rather than people
supporting fusion center efforts to better detect and prevent threats to protect them, they may end
up rejecting the centers and their efforts (The Constitution Project, 2012).
In the process of enhancing strategies to protect the public from adverse criminal or
terrorist activity, measures must be taken to assure them that their inherent human rights are
protected. In order to retain the protection of human rights, fusion centers must enforce data
security, accountability and transparency, and effective training. These measures will help to
develop procedures to protect rights when collecting and sharing high volumes of sensitive
information (The Constitution Project, 2012).
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Data security. Data security is essential in fusion centers due to the vast amounts of
information that they gather, share, and store. Because in some instances fusion centers access
information from databases from other institutions and agencies at the local, state, and federal
levels, consistent security of the shared data may be difficult. One way to monitor data security is
to enforce audit logs where individuals accessing, storing, and sharing information are checked
regularly and are held accountable for their actions. The logs often record network activity
including the user making a certain query, the nature of the query itself, and the information
accessed in the process. Not only does this process deter users from accessing and using
information improperly, but the logs may also protect against intrusion into databases from
unauthorized outsiders or hackers (The Constitution Project, 2012).
Accountability and transparency. Often due to the rapid pace of advancements in
information technology, as well as the nation’s rather limited experience with the centers’
concepts, it is difficult for policymakers to truly understand the nature of fusion center activity.
The secrecy that exists around the centers also causes concern for public oversight. As a result,
fusion centers should first develop clear mission statements that detail the purpose of their
activities and the metrics upon which their performances should be evaluated in order for the
public to understand the centers’ goals. They should also publish the descriptions of their
activities, staffing, budgets, and more. The information will have to remain somewhat broad to
refrain from posting classified information, but the public will at least be aware of their policies
and procedures. Developing such information and making it available to the public creates
openness between fusion center personnel and the community. Consequently, the public can gain
an understanding of the centers’ practices and perhaps gain trust in their activities, thus
increasing public cooperation (The Constitution Project, 2012).
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Since the databases in fusion centers contain sensitive, personal information, the
databases should provide redress for individuals who believe that the systems contain inaccurate
information about them. Redress mechanisms are important because individuals subjected to
inaccurate information may potentially find themselves subject to repeated, intrusive
investigation. An effective redress, however, ensures the accuracy of information stored in fusion
center databases and allows for the opportunity for corrective action should errors occur (The
Constitution Project, 2012).
Training. Finally, standardized training must include a section on legal regulations in
data collection. Training the analysts early on in their careers about the necessary precautions to
take when collecting information will help them to develop practices that support human rights.
Training analysts on legal regulations regarding data collection and storage will also assist in
developing trust among them and the public.
The aforementioned measures to maintain rights while ensuring security strengthen the
trust between the public and fusion centers. Rather than the public opposing the operations of the
centers due to potential violations of human rights, they can instead support them. They may
recognize their efforts to build greater security for the public and defend them against criminal
activity and terroristic threats. Additionally, local communities may even aid in fusion centers’
efforts and partner with them to assist in reducing crime. By taking measures to protect human
rights while enhancing homeland security strategies, fusion centers can start to close the gap
between protecting international human rights and ensuring security.
Practical Application of Human Rights Today
Developing information sharing practices among fusion centers by enhancing
partnerships and implementing training for intelligence analysts, however, may inadvertently

74
INFORMATION SHARING: LOCAL FUSION CENTERS
break international law. Enhancing partnerships leads to an increase in the amount of people that
have access to information. It creates a constant, rapid flow of information and intelligence being
shared between various partners. In the process of a significant amount of people gathering and
sharing personal, sensitive, and classified information, it is easy to inadvertently pass along
information not privy to all. Similarly, training analysts in new ways to collect data on
individuals can have adverse repercussions as the public can become concerned that certain
analysts may utilize those skills to overstep their boundaries, and doing so undetected, when
gathering data. The apprehension is that rather than remaining objective, personal biases or
opinions may lead to potential profiling, causing discrimination concerns and breaking
international laws that ensure equal treatment for all.
International law is not only created to uphold valuable rights for the people, but to
ensure security and peace among varying nations (United Nations, n.d.). Breaking international
law could greatly comprise innate human rights as well as peace and security between different
countries, causing concerns for the safety of the public and security of the United States. For
these reasons, fusion centers must operate under Constitutional law while remaining mindful of
international law.
Conclusion
While improving strategies for fusion centers, it is imperative that human rights and
international laws protecting them are upheld. International laws protect the public and ensure
that they retain rights such as protection from unwarranted government interference as well as
equality and fair treatment (United Nations, n.d.). Breaking such laws would severely infringe
upon the rights of the public, and ultimately cause distrust and conflict between the public and
fusion centers.
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In order to ensure that human rights are protected when developing strategies for local
fusion centers, it is vital to include certain precautionary measures in the strategies. Increased
data security, accountability among law enforcement officials and analysts, transparency among
the centers’ practices, and lessons on legal regulations regarding privacy are a few measures that
can be taken to protect human rights (The Constitution Project, 2012). Overall, these
precautionary measures develop a sense of trust and dependency among the public and fusion
centers. Through such processes, public trust and cooperation can be gained while also
strengthening resilience and security.
In Chapter 8, various intelligence gathering strategies and techniques regarding local
fusion centers will be addressed. A threat assessment on the nation state of China and its
increased intelligence efforts will also be completed.
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Chapter 8: Intelligence Gathering Strategies
Introduction
As advancements in technology and the availability and access to information grow, new
threats to the United States intelligence community emerge. Such advancements have led to the
expansion of cyber threats emanating from hackers, terrorists, and nation states threatening the
security of the U.S. and the safety of its people. In particular, China’s cyber capabilities continue
to excel, expanding their abilities to collect information and intelligence and making them a
viable threat to the U.S. and its intelligence community. China’s role in developing technological
advancements and cyber proficiencies also contribute to their emerging global influence.
As a result of such impending threats from China, United States’ local government
officials must recognize and anticipate cyber-attacks and enhance U.S. intelligence gathering and
sharing strategies to combat them. In order to expand intelligence efforts to combat such threats,
local law enforcement must expand coordination with the federal government and the private
sector to acquire greater resources and assistance. Such collaborative efforts in intelligence
gathering and sharing can be fostered through the use of intelligence fusion centers.
Collaborating and coordinating with local fusion centers to gather and share timely and accurate
intelligence will assist the U.S. intelligence community in detecting, investigating, and
preventing threatening cyberwar activities from China.
Literature Review
The intelligence cycle. The process of gathering valuable intelligence stems from six
important steps known as the intelligence cycle. The intelligence cycle is utilized to transform
raw information into finished, actionable intelligence used by consumers and decision makers.
The six steps of the intelligence cycle include planning and direction, collection, processing and
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exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination, and evaluation (Director of National
Intelligence, 2011).
Planning and direction includes identifying and understanding the consumer’s
intelligence requirements in order to plan the following steps accordingly. Collection is the
gathering of the raw data, or information, involved in developing the intelligence product.
Processing and exploitation consist of transforming the raw information into a comprehensive
format for the final product. This stage requires highly skilled and trained individuals, as well as
advanced technological systems and equipment, who are capable of converting the raw
information into understandable and useable information. The analysis and production phase
entails integrating, analyzing, and preparing the information for its final stages to create
actionable intelligence. Dissemination is the delivery of the finished product to the consumer
who requested the intelligence product. Lastly, the final step of the intelligence cycle is
evaluation. As intelligence products are developed, it is essential to acquire feedback and
evaluate such feedback to ensure understanding of consumers’ evolving information
requirements and needs. Following the intelligence cycle and developing actionable intelligence
is important as intelligence influences decisions and drives response efforts to various threats
(Director of National Intelligence, 2011).
China’s historical activities. China has long been involved in cyber espionage within
the United States. Hacking from China was first observed in 1999 when Chinese patriotic
hackers planted messages on several United States government websites denouncing previous
actions made by NATO. After an international dispute in 2001, the patriotic hackers committed
similar acts, defacing the White House site as well as numerous other United States websites.
The Chinese continued, and advanced their cyber intrusions in 2003 when hackers stole sensitive
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data from computers of the United States Department of Defense. The origin of the attack was
traced back to southern China and was believed to have stemmed from their army. The hackers
also stole data from defense contractors and several other government agencies. The intrusions
appeared to start with spear-phishing, a hacking mechanism that includes sending faux emails to
acquire confidential information. Throughout this time, China managed to steal government
usernames and passwords as well as intellectual property that included Google’s source code and
proposals for weapons systems. In 2013, the U.S. connected a Chinese espionage group to
stealing data, hundreds of terabytes worth, from approximately 141 companies since 2006. The
espionage group was ultimately linked to the People’s Liberation Army in China, leading to the
U.S. indicting the Chinese officers involved in the hacking and economic espionage (Denning,
2017).
Several years ago, Beijing initiated a cyber-enabled industrial attack, stealing intellectual
property from the United States to benefit from U.S. companies’ innovations in information
technology and aerospace. Such cyber intrusions and thefts by China led to significant economic
loss in the U.S, leading the U.S. government to threaten sanctions against Chinese officials and
companies associated with the cyber thefts. The threat of imposing sanctions ultimately resulted
in a negotiated agreement between the U.S. and China in 2015. The agreement established that
neither the United States nor China would conduct any cyber theft of intellectual property for
commercial advantage. It asserted that hacking private companies for commercial benefits was
simply unacceptable. While companies, soon after, recorded steep declines in hacking
performances by the Chinese against the United States, Chinese hackings have recently begun to
appear again (Laskai & Segal, 2019).
In prior years, the intelligence community in the U.S. had begun to acknowledge China’s
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potential cyber intrusions made through the company Huawei. Huawei supplies various telecom
equipment and is the world’s largest producer of such supplies (Muller, 2018). It is a widely
known Chinese organization that accumulates a significant amount of revenue per year and
maintains several offices worldwide. The company, however, has recently been banned by
numerous agencies due to security concerns and espionage threats. Starting in 2010, the U.S.
warned both private companies and agencies of the organization advising that they were acting
as a proxy for Chinese government espionage (Fazzini, 2018) and there was growing concern
that the company’s network gear could contain “back doors” allowing Chinese spies to
effectively hack into critical network infrastructure. With the threats of the company’s equipment
being used to spy on the U.S., as well as other countries, the U.S. has recently requested the
arrest of a top Huawei executive (Muller, 2018).
Key Threat Assessment
China’s intelligence. Historically, China’s purpose, definition, and goal of intelligence
remained similar to the United States, demonstrating the importance of valuable knowledge in
decision making and preventing advances of adversaries that could cause harm. More modern
definitions of Chinese intelligence include the importance of gathering information to foster
domestic stability, ensure national security, and protect corporate interests in a rather competitive
world. Although somewhat similar to the U.S. intelligence uses, intelligence organizations
operate in regard to national policy and the country’s needs and priorities. Chinese intelligence,
as a result, tends to focus more on domestic terrorism, which is typically different from the U.S.,
as China often has fewer foreign links. Due to the expansion of the Internet and mobile
communications in China, Chinese authorities have also increased investment in their internal
security (Mattis, 2012).
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While previously influenced by intelligence-led policing, in recent years, China began to
adopt “public security informatization” (Mattis, 2012, p. 50) indicating the value in integrating
public information more closely with police operations. This included developing domestic
intelligence gathering and ensuring information management. China formerly directed its
officers to focus on information collection regarding social disturbances in order to link and
aggregate local and national level databases with personal information from various businesses
requiring government name registration. The information provided in such databases would be
utilized to automatically generate tasks for the country’s police officers when a person-of-interest
would turn up in their jurisdiction. Later, the Chinese integrated such information collection and
intelligence practices with public opinion monitoring to influence decision making about actions
in the public sphere. In addition to supporting decision making in China, Chinese intelligence is
utilized by their military forces to manipulate decision making of adversaries, develop offensive
counterintelligence, and improve capabilities to destroy opponents’ technical skills (Mattis,
2012).
Enhancing capabilities. With rapid advancements in technology and the cyber world,
China has sought to make improvements regarding the expansion of their cyberwarfare
capabilities. More specifically, Chinese leadership has begun to collaborate with the military,
corporations, and universities to improve cyber capabilities. In 2017, the Chinese Education
Ministry and the Central Cyberspace Affairs Leading Group developed a joint decree
formalizing various rules on building first-rate cybersecurity schools. The goal of the plan is
to develop approximately four to six world-class cyber security schools in universities in
China. Such schools will be utilized solely for training purposes to create cyber experts. After
several years of training in school, the students will work in a corporate setting and
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outstanding graduates will become members of the Strategic Support Force, a wing of the
People’s Liberation Army that is in charge of electronic and cyber warfare. Such collaboration
with Chinese universities demonstrates the extent to which China has begun to expand its cyber
capabilities. The training in the universities exhibits the enhancements of China’s identification,
recruitment, and establishment of numerous highly skilled individuals with cyber proficiencies
who will then work in the cyber and technology division of China’s military force (Yang, 2017).
As technologies such as cloud-based computer networks and IoT (Internet of Things) and
various devices and systems connected to the Internet expand, China seeks to steal technological
innovations from other advanced countries, such as the United States, to utilize for their own
benefits. Various U.S. entities such as sectors focusing on artificial intelligence, Internet
connected devices, cloud computing, energy, biotechnology, high-end medical devices and more
were targeted in 2017 and 2018 by hackers believed to be linked to China. They have also been
continuously accused of hacking companies involved in industrial manufacturing, aerospace,
healthcare, solar, and electronics. It is important to consider what companies or
government facilities may have also been hacked by China, but went unnoticed and
undetected as a result of their advanced proficiencies (Harrell, 2018).
A recent cyber-attack on the Marriott hotel chain is believed to have been enabled by
China’s intelligence as the U.S. identified computer patterns and codes from the hack that are
typically associated with Chinese cyber operations. The attack was performed in order to gather
personal information on millions of Americans, namely government and military personnel, as
the Marriott hotel is the top hotel where law enforcement and military officials stay. The attack
resulted in the Chinese being able to retrieve security clearance files of several Americans.
Security clearances tend to contain birth dates, phone numbers, financial data, family
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information, and itineraries such as meetings with foreigners. Additionally, Marriott databases do
not only contain credit card information, but passport data as well. It was estimated that
approximately 327 million consumers were impacted as a result of Chinese hackers stealing their
passport numbers. U.S. intelligence reports reveal China’s plans and efforts to obtain names of
American government officials and executives with security clearances and build a database with
such information (Sanger, Perlroth, Thursh, & Rappeport, 2018).
Additionally, one of the most damaging breaches of security for the United States
government occurred when China hacked the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) in 2014,
acquiring approximately 23 million records of American federal workers. The OPM is the main
source for federal government personnel records which include sensitive information. Financial
data, social security numbers, and documents containing personal information about those who
apply for security clearances are included in the records. Similar to the attack on the Marriott
Hotel, Chinese hackers were also able to retrieve information on relatives of those who apply for
security clearances. Initiating a two-part attack, Chinese actors disguised themselves as
employees of a subcontractor group, KeyPoint Government Solutions, and installed malware,
compromising OPM’s records (Gertz, 2019). While the attack on the OPM took place in 2014, it
was not discovered until 2015. Gathering and aggregating personal data, especially of American
government personnel, is a major concern for the safety and security of the U.S. China’s ability
to access and obtain this personal information leaves the U.S. vulnerable to further threats as
China has the advantage of retaining that information to potentially leverage policy or decisions
impacting the U.S. (Sanger et al., 2018).
China’s global influence. China’s recognition of the expansion of the cyber world and
its influence has led them to develop approximately a five-year plan involving cyber
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enhancements that began back in 2016. The primary function of the plan is to develop cyber
innovations in China as well as expand their cyber influence globally. In order to accomplish
this, the Chinese are focusing on certain cyber and technological developments such as quantum
computing, robotics, semiconductors, and artificial intelligence (AI). Developing, expanding,
and improving such technologies will significantly enhance China’s influence over the global
market as well as give them power in the cyber realm (Segal, 2018).
Unlike most computers, quantum computing gives the computers the ability to perform
several calculations at once. Combining technology and mathematics, quantum computing
enables a significant increase in the rate at which a problem may be solved. Not only would
developments and advancements in quantum computing result in potential economic benefits,
but Chinese intelligence may be able to break through current, modern encryptions (Segal,
2018).
Additionally, the Chinese seek to develop artificial intelligence for military purposes with
a focus on autonomous drone swarms and software programs to defend against cyberattacks. In
order to determine what AI capabilities to develop research on, the Chinese government has
studied what AI companies contain the most advanced systems. These companies include
Alibaba, the e-commerce company, and iFLYTEK, a voice recognition software establishment.
The organizations are among the first to develop superior systems that can drive autonomous
cars, act as intelligent voice assistants, and manage smart cities. Learning from these companies
who have developed some of the greatest AI capabilities today will help China to determine how
to further enhance such developments and excel in AI proficiencies, giving China a greater
advantage over cyber global influence (Segal, 2018).
Social media. In addition to technological advancements, social media and its prevalence
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around the world significantly contributes to China’s global influence. More people in China
currently have access to the Internet than any other country (Segal, 2018). Their abilities to
access, view, and utilize the Internet allow China to use social media as a means to obtain social
and political instability, assisting in carrying out movements and protests that the Chinese
government seeks to trigger. Social media remains as a source for information dissemination that
aids the government in furthering their political and social agendas. By monitoring social media
accounts and sites, they can continue to influence the spread of political or social unrest. The
easy access to the Internet, the constant utilization of social media, and the rapid spread of
information makes social media a significant platform for influencing political and social change
(Jinghua, 2019). China is even working to develop ways to use artificial intelligence for
programs that gain access to social media to predict political movements (Segal, 2018).
Solutions. In order to protect companies and agencies from cyber intrusions, the
Department of Homeland Security strongly encourages the private sector to take defense
precautions. While cyber precautionary measures are beneficial and companies should protect
their information and consumers from cyberattacks, it is important to focus on analyzing the
scope of cyber threats and identifying those behind them. The Department of Homeland Security
has sought to enhance public-private partnerships, as well as develop new technologies, that will
improve practices in cybersecurity. Collaboration efforts can be enhanced by gathering
information on cyber threats from the public sector and leveraging resources from the private
sector. Combined, such partnerships will contribute to identifying, mitigating, and preventing
cyberattacks from China (Harrell, 2018).
Intelligence gathering. Local law enforcement officials are often the first to detect a
potential threat to the community as well as the first to respond to it. Due to their situational
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awareness, it is crucial to enforce efficient and effective information gathering techniques to
recognize signs of cyber intrusions early on as well as develop actionable intelligence to
influence response efforts and further prevent the threat. In order for local law enforcement to
recognize cyber warnings, mitigate impacts, and stop future attacks, they must collaborate with
the federal government, the private sector, and the intelligence community.
While cyber threats must first originate in a locality, thereby making local law
enforcement the first to respond to the incident, the federal government is crucial in providing
resources and developing intelligence to assist in cyber investigations. In order to combat
cybercrimes, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in particular, has taken several steps to
ensure accurate intelligence, improve technological skills, and build partnerships to share
developing cyber information (FBI, n.d.).
The FBI has developed a cyber division at their Headquarters and has trained cyber
squads with enhanced cyber skills that will assist in investigating various cybercrimes, including
theft of personal information and intellectual property and online fraud. The FBI also has Cyber
Action Teams that consist of cyber experts that travel worldwide to assist in gathering
intelligence regarding computer intrusion cases that are particularly threatening to the security of
the United States. The teams contain both agents and computer experts who are trained in
forensic investigations, malware analysis, and computer language. Growing partnerships allow
the FBI to leverage resources from other federal agencies as well as local and state law
enforcement personnel that exhibit situational awareness and retrieve initial information
regarding an incident (FBI, n.d.).
Currently, the FBI’s Cyber Initiative and Resource Fusion Unit (CIRFU) collaborates
with the National Cyber Forensics and Training Alliance (NCFTA) in order to gather
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intelligence to combat cybercrimes. The National Cyber Forensics and Training Alliance is a
forward thinking organization that proactively addresses cybercrimes by coordinating with law
enforcement, the private sector, and academia sources. By collaborating with this organization,
the Cyber Initiative and Resource Fusion Unit is able to draw extensive intelligence on cyber
related threats that stem from sources such as the private sector, the FBI’s Crime Complaint
Center, and even the Computer Emergency Response Team from Carnegie Mellon University.
Building such partnerships and establishing intelligence sources allows both the FBI’s CIRFU
and NCFTA to build strategic and tactical products, as well as threat intelligence analysis, to
identify and prevent emerging cyber threats (FBI, n.d.).
In addition to the federal government, private sectors have begun to recognize the
importance of building alliances to prevent evolving cyber threats. In order to access real time
threat intelligence to ensure rapid response efforts, cyber security companies have come together
to form the Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA). Organizations such as Fortinet, McAfee, Symantec,
and Cisco have developed the alliance to gather intelligence from multiple sources and enhance
real time response efforts. The alliance focuses on reducing the time to detect a threat, closing
gaps between the detection and deployment cycle, and developing real time cyber threat
information sharing among companies in the cybersecurity field. Not only does such information
help to prevent cyber attacks more rapidly, but sharing the information among the companies
helps to forewarn one another about potential attacks on their systems so that they can
immediately respond (Xie, 2018).
The aforementioned companies begin their intelligence gathering by establishing a list of
manufactures, OS versions, and devices to determine what devices and systems may be
susceptible to exploits and cyber intrusions. After tracking their devices, the companies collect
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and analyze data such as IoT and multi-cloud devices to develop threat intelligence. They also
work to constantly update logs to ensure that local data is combined with external intelligence
needed to gain a full picture of potential cyber threats. Combining data helps to identify
indicators of cyber vulnerabilities that require speedy response (Xie, 2018).
Fusion centers. Fusion centers maintain situational awareness, gather information to
develop timely and accurate intelligence on impending threats, and share intelligence with
appropriate partners such as law enforcement officials and the private sector. The
aforementioned abilities allow fusion centers to effectively detect potential threats so that law
enforcement can investigate and work to prevent it. Such actions are particularly useful to
cybercrimes as detecting a cyber-attack in its early stages is crucial to preventing further damage
such as loss of information or stealing of classified, sensitive data (DOJ, 2015).
Integrating the cyber community into fusion centers is extremely valuable in enhancing
information gathering and sharing abilities among the centers to combat cyberwarfare of all
kinds. Fusion centers are a valuable asset in cybersecurity in that they are a common source for
gathering information, such as cybercrime incidents, from multiple partners. Gathering and
analyzing such information allows the centers to establish patterns or trends from the data that
they can then share with law enforcement and the cyber community. Cyber communities provide
fusion centers with information regarding malicious indicators and possible precursors of illegal
cyber activity. Such information can include potential patterns of malicious activity, Internet
Protocol (IP) addresses, and information developed on new cyber techniques impacting the
private sector. They also assist in providing an understanding of raw information such as
malware code and abnormal computer activity (DOJ, 2015).
Some fusion centers host cyber community liaisons as resources to efficient information
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gathering and sharing capabilities. These personnel tend to exhibit expertise in areas regarding
industrial control systems and emerging technologies and software systems. They are also
contacts for resources involving cyber subsectors such as Website hosting companies, Internet
Service Providers, and mobile platform companies. Fusion centers, in turn, develop relevant
cyber products including technical, strategic, and tactical developments, that not only assist in
the cyber community but also law enforcement. Sharing pertinent cyber intelligence allows local
law enforcement personnel to better prepare for potential threats, such as increased cyber threats
from China, as analysis completed by the centers gives law enforcement partners the ability to
plan accordingly (DOJ, 2015). As China continues to support Chinese actors committing
cybercrimes impacting United States’ facilities, integration and collaboration among local fusion
centers and local law enforcement is crucial.
In December 2018, two Chinese actors were indicted for conspiracy to commit wire
fraud, computer intrusion, and aggravated identity theft. The men, Zhu Hua and Zhang Shilong,
are members of the Advanced Persistent Threat 10, or APT 10, a hacking group associated to the
Chinese government. By engaging in spear phishing, the hackers were able to introduce malware
into targeted computers and subsequently obtain information from said computers. By sending
emails that appear to be legitimate, the hackers unleashed attachments that installed a program to
record all keystrokes on the machine, allowing them to obtain usernames and passwords. APT 10
has conducted several secretive operations where they were able to steal data from numerous
companies encompassing industries such as finance, manufacturing, and health care (FBI, 2018).
The Chinese actors’ abilities to not only commit cyber espionage, but cybercrimes such
as fraud and identity theft that impact industries in the U.S., require immediate action from local
fusion centers and local law enforcement to mitigate such crimes. Similar to their tactics for
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espionage, the Chinese engage in online fraud and identity theft crimes by hacking into computer
systems, infecting emails through spear phishing, enabling proxies, and influencing social media.
The Chinese actors’ ability to retrieve classified personal data also allows them to utilize such
information to craft spear phishing emails and gain access to any computer. They can similarly
use the accounts to send fake emails claiming to be from colleagues in different facilities
(Nakashima, 2015). Spear phishing emails affect local businesses, banks, and schools, thus
requiring the response of local law enforcement and fusion centers. They are the first to respond
and the first to initiate an investigation into the cyber related crime affecting their community.
Limitations / Problems
Based on prior cyber incidents committed by China, as well as continuous advancements
in technology and intelligence capabilities, it is evident that China is a threat to the United States
and its intelligence community. Although fusion centers can assist in overcoming cyber threats
by enhancing intelligence gathering and information sharing regarding cyber threats, there are
still challenges that they must resolve. While the aforementioned practices contribute to better
preparation and response efforts regarding cyber threats emanating from China, there are also
some limitations to combating these threats.
Education. Collecting information on cyber threats requires significant knowledge and
understanding of cybercrimes. In order for fusion centers and local law enforcement officials to
gather information on cybercrimes, they have to possess significant technological skills,
understand cyber related terms, and undergo training on how to investigate, analyze, and
preserve such data. Recognizing digital footprints and understanding how different cyber threats,
such as ransomwares, are delivered is essential. They must also understand phishing and
spoofing terms in order to identify various cyber fraud crimes as well as recognize emails with
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potential malware imbedded in them. A lack of education on the part of law enforcement also
makes it challenging for the private sector to understand the criminal threat. With a continuous
rise in cybercrimes, law enforcement officials must be able to analyze cyber threats and assess
their risks, allowing them to provide such information to the private sector (Gercke, 2012).
Jurisdictions. Different regional differences cause some concerns for combating
cybercrimes. Not only do different jurisdictions make it difficult to prosecute hackers, provided
that they are identified and apprehended in the first place, but it is difficult to coordinate with
other countries regarding cyber threats. In order to successfully prevent China from cyber
espionage or attacks, the United States must cooperate with other countries who are allies and
will aid the U.S. in developing precautions to stop China from committing online crimes. The
United States cannot gather all the necessary information and intelligence that is needed to
combat cybercrimes originating from China unless aided and supported by other nations
(Gercke, 2012).
Funding. These aforementioned developments require funding, education, advanced
technologies, and strategic planning and policy developments. In 2017, focusing on the issue of
encryption, the Department of Justice requested $21.6 million from the federal budget. The
Department of Justice requested the funds in order to acquire new, advanced tools for analyzing
encrypted electronic devices as well as develop and expand various in-house expertise. Funding
required for cybersecurity appears to be continuously increasing. Further additions such as
advanced education and training only add to those costs and create a rather heavy burden on the
economy. Even agencies that are well funded may find challenges in acquiring the necessary
budget to allot for hiring technology experts, training officers in cybercrimes and updated
software systems, and developing and implementing cybercrime prevention policies and
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regulations. Rapidly evolving cyber threats make it extremely challenging for the U.S. economy
to keep up and continue to ensure cybersecurity (Police Executive Research Forum, 2018).
Conclusion
The staggering change and developments in the cyber world have caused the need for the
United States to recognize new cyber-related threats impacting society. As the use of the Internet
grows and expands, so do the crimes that take place in cyberspace. The easy access and
availability, as well as anonymity, behind the Internet allows hackers, terrorists, and different
nation states to take advantage of the cyber realm. Such abilities have created a significant shift
from physical crimes to cybercrimes that are predominantly difficult to detect, trace, investigate,
and respond to.
China, in particular, has utilized the expansion of the Internet to their benefit. Already
involved in numerous espionage incidents in the United States from past events, China has
sought to develop their cyber abilities to improve their spying opportunities on the United States.
While China tends to focus on private sector companies and stealing their new ideas related to
superior technologies, there is also the concern that China is building such capabilities to secure
a strong military as well as steal personal data on Americans and intelligence from the American
government.
As China continues their developments, it is crucial for the United States to foster
intelligence gathering and information sharing among law enforcement partners and the private
sector. The private sector is often impacted from such cyber incidents attacking their critical
infrastructure and companies’ innovations. Law enforcement has the ability to provide
knowledge on the cyber threat and investigate. Combining these efforts is crucial to preventing
major cyber-attacks. Advanced intelligence gathering and sharing to prevent the attacks can be
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developed through the use of fusion centers as they provide situational awareness, develop
timely and accurate intelligence, and share cyber related threats among law enforcement
personnel and the private sector. Combining resources and efforts among fusion centers to
combat cybercrimes will assist in better identifying, mitigating, and preventing cyber threats
from China impacting the United States.
The next chapter, Chapter 9, will address technology and critical infrastructure
protection. It will specifically focus on the relevance of the information technology sector and its
relation to local fusion centers as well as the importance of protecting the sector from criminal
and terrorist threats. Chapter 9 will also offer ways to enhance security for the sector and reduce
risks.
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Chapter 9: Technology and Critical Infrastructure Protection
Introduction
Critical infrastructure includes various assets, networks, and systems that provide for
everyday functions and activities of the United States. The critical infrastructure sectors are
considered so vital to the operations of the United States that a negative impact on any one of
them would have a devastating effect on the safety of the people and security of America (DHS,
2018a). Because the sectors affect essential operations and functions provided by the United
States, they also impact fusion centers and their abilities to detect and prevent threats. In order to
ensure fusion centers can perform their daily functions, it is essential to protect critical
infrastructure sectors that fusion centers rely upon to operate.
Critical Infrastructure Sectors
There are a total of 16 critical infrastructure sectors. The sectors include chemical,
commercial facilities, communications, critical manufacturing, dams, defense industrial base,
emergency services, energy, financial services, food and agriculture, government facilities,
healthcare and public health, information technology, nuclear reactors, materials, and waste,
transportation systems, and water and wastewater systems. These sectors are essential to the
national security, national public health and safety, and national economic security of the United
States (DHS, 2018a).
While all critical infrastructures are vital for the safety and security of the country, the
information technology (IT) sector is a rather significant infrastructure in today’s society as
numerous businesses, companies, government facilities, and citizens rely greatly on the sector.
The information technology sector provides both hardware and software services and, along with
the communications sector, produces the Internet. Without successful functionality of the sector,
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numerous facilities and their operations may fail, thus affecting the economy. Without the
infrastructure, a lack of daily communications that citizens rely on through Wi-Fi and the
Internet may lead to panic. Most importantly, government facilities that operate under advanced
information technology systems may be compromised, thus threatening security and safety of the
public (DHS, 2017b).
While impacted by several critical infrastructure sectors such as communications and
energy, local fusion centers and their operations rely greatly on the information technology
sector and are directly impacted by its functions. Through computers and other hardware
products, fusion centers utilize software systems and databases to gather, store, retrieve, and
share information (DOJ, 2009). As a result, in order for fusion centers to effectively gather and
share such information, the information technology infrastructure must be protected and
defended from any threats that could compromise or destroy its functions and capabilities.
Information technology assets. In order for the information technology critical
infrastructure to remain secure, it is important to protect its critical nodes and links. Critical
nodes are the sector’s most valuable assets that if compromised or threatened in any way could
severely harm the overall operations and functions of the sector. In addition to the critical nodes,
the critical links demonstrate the connection between the assets. In some sectors, it would require
several assets to be negatively impacted in order for the sector to drastically be affected. In
others, however, the threat or negative impact on just one critical node could have severe
repercussions on the sector (Dhurde & Deshpande, 2014).
Hardware products and software systems. Hardware products and software systems
are the critical nodes of the IT sector as they allow the sector to perform its operations. Hardware
products consist of items such as computers, ipads, smartphones, hard drives, routers, firewall

95
INFORMATION SHARING: LOCAL FUSION CENTERS
hardware, and more. Such items are essential to the information technology sector as they are the
physical products that allow access to software systems, databases, and the Internet. Software
systems, on the other hand, include operating and application systems that provide the ability to
perform certain, specific tasks. Examples of software systems include Microsoft Office and
Internet browsers such as Safari and Google Chrome. Additionally, the software systems allow
for the creation of databases that gather, store, retrieve, and share information (IT Infrastructure,
2013).
Both the hardware products and software systems of the information technology sector
greatly rely on one another. The negative impact on one asset has the potential to affect the other
asset and cause a significant failure to the sector. Without the hardware products such as
computers and ipads, there would be no way to access the software systems, databases, or the
Internet. Similarly, without access to the software systems and databases to collect, retrieve, or
share information, the hardware products would remain useless. Both critical nodes must be
protected to ensure that information technology remains secure and that a catastrophic failure
does not occur (IT Infrastructure, 2013).
Information technology threats. Because the information technology sector supports
the United States’ every day functions, it is vital to ensure that the critical nodes of the
information technology sector are protected against threats. Some threats include both cyber and
physical attacks. Cyber-attacks include any harmful act conducted in cyber space in the attempt
to dismantle or destroy a computer system or network. Cyber-attacks are particularly threatening
to the information technology sector as the critical infrastructure relies almost solely on the
Internet and computer systems to perform their everyday activities. A cyber-attack on the sector
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would severely impact its software systems, and databases, thus impacting the entire sector’s
functions (Fisher, 2016).
Cyber-attacks. Cyber-attacks are often performed by hackers with the intent of either
stealing, distributing, or destroying classified information. Because fusion centers often gather
and share vital, classified intelligence, an attack on their software systems would cause a breach
in security. Similarly, years of intelligence from wide-scale operations could be compromised or
potentially destroyed from a cyber-attack. Such attacks even have the potential to be deployed by
internal threats, whereby individuals already have the skills, due to training, to complete cyberattacks. In addition to hackers, terrorists may have an interest in attacking through cyberspace. A
negative impact on the Internet or Wi-Fi would result in people not being able to communicate
with one another. Additionally, companies and facilities that operate through technological
systems would shut down and be negatively impacted economically (Fisher, 2016). Such
repercussions can result in public fear and panic.
Physical attacks. In addition to cyber-attacks, physical attacks may also take place.
Physical attacks will often harm the hardware products in fusion centers that allow for the
utilization of software systems and databases. Such instances can stem from terrorism, through
the physical attacks of companies or government facilities that host numerous hardware services
in their buildings, thus destroying them. The attacks may also stem from natural disasters that
cause damage and destruction to homes, businesses, institutions, and many more that operate
with hardware products. Just as with software systems, any drastic impact on the hardware
products alone could cause damage to the entire IT sector (IT Infrastructure, 2013).
Although both cyber and physical attacks have the potential to develop serious
consequences for the operations of the information technology sector, cyber-attacks have a much
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greater probability of occurring than physical attacks. Cyber-attacks are often successfully
accomplished because of the level of advancements that society has reached in regard to the
cyber world. Hackers can now hack systems at an accelerated speed and break through firewalls
seamlessly and without detection. In addition, terrorists can utilize IT to their benefits by
reaching out to young, impressionable individuals for recruitment through social media. Such
easy access to the online world has not only made gathering supporters significantly easier for
terrorists, but it has allowed them to spread their ideologies all over the world. Lastly, cyberattacks can be accomplished quickly and quietly. In some instances, companies, institutions, or
government facilities will not know that they have been hacked or compromised until it is too
late and their systems have been breached (Weimann, 2004). Such stealthily operations are
particularly concerning for the IT sector and fusion centers.
Risk-Based Resource Allocation
In order to disrupt threats to the information technology infrastructure, countermeasures
to protect the sector must be developed. Such countermeasures can be developed through the
apportioned risk reduction method. The apportioned risk reduction includes spreading available
resources and funds across as many threats to the sector as possible. This, in turn, helps to reduce
the risk to all potential threats to the sector (Lewis, 2006).
Security measures. In order to protect the sector, security measures should be checked
on, as well as advanced, constantly and consistently. Security systems must be monitored at all
times to ensure that they are functioning and that they have not been compromised. They should
also be updated often. If the security systems remain the same, it becomes easier for the attackers
to recognize the current system and locate potential weak spots where they can penetrate the
system. Constantly monitoring and building security efficiency and performance helps to avoid
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complacency, which would otherwise make it extremely easy for attackers to initiate their plans
and successfully attack. Similarly, updating and reviewing emergency plans, should an attack
take place, will help to build procedures to fix current security flaws (Vulnerability Assessment,
2001).
Training. It is also important to retain personnel that are highly advanced in technology
and cyber skills. Not only should their skills be proficient, but they must be able to recognize
threats early on. Whether it be a virus spreading throughout the networks or hackers stealing
classified information, it is essential that the IT security personnel recognize warning signs early
on. If the attack cannot be prevented, then at least early recognition will ensure that there is not
complete destruction or loss of information or intelligence. They should also be able to recognize
emails or links that may contain viruses that are harmful to their servers. Such superior skills can
be developed through advanced training programs that focus on topics such as hacking, viruses,
failure of software systems, as well as ways to prevent and respond to such incidents. The
programs should essentially develop experts in the evolving information technology sector where
the personnel supporting United States government facilities can begin to surpass the skills of
hackers (Vulnerability Assessment, 2001).
Information sharing. Lastly, it is essential to forewarn other centers and agencies should
a cyber-attack take place, especially in local fusion centers. If fusion centers are able to
recognize the initial stages of a cyber-attack in their center, they must caution other agencies
about a potential attack on their systems. The centers gather and develop their intelligence by
sharing information with other centers and agencies. They also share several databases where the
information is stored and shared (DHS, 2017c). Should the information in one center be
compromised by a cyber-attack, then other centers may be impacted as well. Collaborating with
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other fusion centers to prepare for and prevent cyber-attacks will assist in disrupting further
damage to the centers and protect important, classified information that each has gathered and
shared over periods of time.
Redundancies. In the event that a cyber-attack does take place, response plans must be in
place. If fusion centers fall victim to a cyber-attack, the centers must look towards their federal
partners to provide them with the necessary resources and funds to restore their operations as
quickly as possible (DHS, 2017c). Additionally, the center must collaborate with the Multi-State
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC). MS-ISAC is a facility designed as a key
resource for cyber threat prevention, response, and recovery for the country’s local, state, tribal,
and territorial partners. Designated as a cyber-resource by DHS, the facility serves local fusion
centers and can greatly assist in response efforts in the event of a cyber-attack. Composed of
security experts, the center’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) also provides
malware analysis, malicious code analysis and mitigation, computer and network forensics, and
incident response. Fusion centers can report incidents ranging from unauthorized access to
intelligence, compromised passwords, execution of viruses or malware, and more. CERT
responds with forensic analysis, reverse engineering, threat intelligence, and mitigation and
response efforts (Multi-State Information Sharing & Analysis Center, n.d.).
Budget. Protection for hardware products and software systems in fusion centers requires
sufficient funding and grants from the Department of Homeland Security. Specifically, the
centers are often funded by the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) that helps to ensure
equipment for core capabilities for operations and security for the facilities. The program
consists of the State Homeland Security Program, the Urban Area Security Initiative, and
Operation Stonegarden. Combined, these programs fund the necessary equipment that fusion
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centers request in order to strengthen their abilities and their overall missions (DHS, 2018c).
In order for fusion centers to request funds for their hardware products and software
system, they must comply with several rules. The requests regarding the investments should
reference the specific performance areas that the funding is intended to support or reasons why
the funding is requested and deemed necessary for the centers. Additionally, all centers in
different jurisdictions should be able to utilize the requested funds. The funds should support
various centers and their activities in intelligence gathering and sharing. Local fusion centers
seeking the funds must ensure that efforts in support of the centers’ initiatives are integrated and
coordinated with other fusion centers (DHS, 2018c).
Fiscal year. Accompanying the fiscal year 2018 Appropriation for the Department of
Homeland Security, Congress expressed that the Secretary must fund up to 85 percent of the
nationwide risk. As a result, the Secretary designated 32 urban areas that were eligible for such
funds under the Urban Area Security Initiative. One of the facilities eligible for the funds
included fusion centers as Congress found it necessary to utilize the funds for the centers in order
to prioritize cybersecurity projects and technological integration and capabilities to assist in
managing emerging threats (DHS, n.d.).
While several other groups and facilities were allotted funds from the Urban Area
Security Initiative (UASI), overall the program received approximately $580,000,000 in 2018 to
share with each group and put towards their efforts (FEMA, 2018). Depending on how much of
the funds the other recipients of the program require for their initiatives, fusion centers have the
ability to utilize the allotted budget from the Initiative to support their technological
advancements and security systems for their operations (DHS, n.d.).
The allotted budget for the centers must be split to support both the hardware products
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and the software systems. As previously mentioned, the apportioned risk reduction takes the
given budget and spreads it evenly among the critical nodes of the infrastructure in order to
protect the sector’s assets and reduce the risks to all possible threats (Lewis, 2006). The budget
can be used for costs of new computer systems or additional iPad as well as advanced software
systems and anti-virus and anti-malware systems for the centers. Databases can be expanded to
store vast amounts of information and technological advancements can be made to ensure that
systems are interoperable among various agencies. Backup systems may also be developed and
implemented in the event of an attack. Lastly, the budget can assist in training purposes so that
analysts and law enforcement individuals who work in fusion centers are trained in advanced
information technology systems. While the budget may fluctuate from year to year, the goal is to
show the importance of fusion centers and the functions of their IT critical nodes so that they can
receive the highest budget possible to continue to advance their systems to defend against any
cyber-attacks (DHS, n.d.).
Conclusion
In order to protect and secure the information technology sector, it is necessary to protect
its hardware products and software systems as harm to these assets could have potential dire
consequences to the sector and its functions (IT Infrastructure, 2013). This is particularly true for
fusion centers that operate through software systems and databases to store, retrieve, and share
vital information. Based on the centers’ use of technology, software systems, and databases,
there is a high probability that threats will emanate from cyber-attacks, rather than physical. As a
result, it is important to strengthen security measures, retain personnel that are highly advanced
in technology and cyber skills, and forewarn other centers and agencies should a cyber-attack
begin to take place.
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Chapter 10 will discuss the benefits of multidisciplinary approaches to homeland
security. More specifically, it will address how fusion centers can also assist in all hazards by
collaborating and coordinating with several different disciplines.
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Chapter 10: Multidisciplinary Approaches to Homeland Security
Introduction
In order to enhance collaborative efforts of fusion centers, it is vital to adopt
multidisciplinary approaches. Multidisciplinary approaches include integrating numerous
disciplines into a collective community to build successful homeland security plans (Wyckoff,
2015). While fusion centers often collaborate with law enforcement personnel, they should also
cooperate with varying disciplines in emergency management. Although fusion centers primarily
assist in criminal and terrorism-related incidents, their abilities to function as a conduit for
information sharing may prove to be beneficial for all types of hazards (Harris, 2008).
While disciplines such as police, fire, emergency management personnel, health
providers, etc. often maintain different resources, roles, and responsibilities, they share similar
goals in seeking to prepare for, mitigate, and prevent manmade events and natural disasters.
Because several disciplines become involved in emergencies, fusion centers can assist in
emergency management by sharing information with responders. In order to do so, fusion centers
and the various disciplines must come together to strengthen collaborative efforts.
Emergency Preparedness and Response
The emergency management cycle can guide fusion centers and various disciplines to
build collaborative plans and practices for emergency management. The emergency management
cycle contains essential activities that all partners must follow in order to prepare for and respond
to an incident. More specifically, the cycle is comprised of planning, organizing, gathering
equipment, training, exercising, and evaluating and improving.
Emergency management cycle. Planning involves the collection and analysis of
information as well as the development of procedures. It allows the stakeholders to learn their
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roles, as well as others, in the plan and determine capability requirements early on. This greatly
aids in shortening the time required to gain control of an adverse event. Organizing is the process
of strengthening leadership at each level and developing an organizational structure where
responders can work together more efficiently. In order to practice the developed plan and
perform assigned tasks, it is important to acquire various equipment, supplies, and systems.
Analysts, law enforcement personnel assigned to fusion centers, and other disciplines must be
able to share commonly understood resources when responding to a severe incident. Training
prepares the partners with the training and assets to accomplish their goals. Exercising includes
practicing the plans that have been developed. Testing the plans with all partners aids in
determining whether they may be successful or not. Lastly, evaluating and improving complete
the emergency management cycle. Evaluating strategies helps to identify what is working
successfully as well as any deficiencies that may exist in the plans. Whether or not the plan is
considered successful, it is important to always continue improving and developing specific
recommendations for changes in practices (DHS, 2008).
Whole Community and Mega-Communities Concepts
A whole community consists of different disciplines, such as emergency management
personnel, government officials, the private sector, and the public, collectively assessing the
needs of their communities to strengthen their capacities (FEMA, 2011). In order to strengthen
the communities’ capacities, the whole community can build a megacommunity and collaborate
together. Megacommunities include various disciplines, such as law enforcement, fire, medical
services, public health, emergency management, and leaders within them, coming together to
work towards common goals (DHS, 2008). Megacommunities also acknowledge the importance
of incorporating businesses, government, and civil society in the relationship. Developing such
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open-ended networks where disciplines can learn from one another, share resources, and develop
partnerships is what strengthens their approaches to homeland security strategies. Integrating the
disciplines into a megacommunity develops greater emergency management planning,
communication pathways, and resilience (Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008).
Fusion centers benefit from forming a megacommunity in that they are able to better
collaborate with different partners to gather and share information in a timely manner. Sharing
such information in a timely fashion helps to detect threats in an expedited time frame, catch
suspects before they commit further crimes, dismantle potential criminal or terrorist operations,
and potentially assist in emergencies, such as natural disasters, by providing information to
response teams. Additionally, while several disciplines retain different tasks such as gathering
and sharing information, caretaking and providing services to victims, or organizing response
plans, they all share similar goals in preventing or mitigating adverse incidents. Developing a
megacommunity with fusion center personnel and various disciplines allows the groups to better
collaborate as a team.
Partnerships. Fostering partnerships among the different disciplines helps to increase
collaborative efforts among fusion centers. Partnerships assist in strengthening cooperation
among the disciplines to improve preparedness and response methods. While each discipline
often maintains their own roles, tasks, and resources, they all tend to have a level of dependency
on one another. Without cooperation among them, it would be extremely difficult to ensure the
best possible results for otherwise adverse events.
Fusion centers coordinate with various partners, including local, state, tribal, and federal
levels through the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related information (DHS,
2017d). In an adverse incident, the local level initiates the response as they maintain situational
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awareness in their community. Within the community, local fire, emergency services, public
health, police, and several other responders are usually the first to respond to an incident as well
as the last to leave the site. Additionally, the state assists the local level in their abilities as they
provide resources to them. The tribal level also often requests the states’ varying resources and
assistance when needed. Federal partners contribute to domestic incidents and regularly maintain
several operations by supporting fusion centers and their initiatives. For example, fusion centers
often collaborate with local FBI joint terrorism task forces where they can utilize federal
government resources and share homeland security information (DHS, 2016). Similarly, fusion
centers support the federal government by providing them with critical state and local
intelligence and subject matter expertise (DHS, 2018b). Non-governmental facilities also aid in
response measures by acquiring local volunteers, providing emergency services such as food and
water, and implementing search and rescue (Course Overview, n.d.).
Lastly, the private sector has become a major influence in multidisciplinary approaches,
including collaborating with fusion centers. Private sector partners are typically the first to detect
precursor criminal or terrorist activity. Developing a strong partnership among the private sector
and fusion centers assists both government and industry decision makers in better understanding,
detecting, preparing for, and responding to emerging threats while also aiding in reducing risks
to the community (DHS, 2014). The private sector also has resources, such as specialized experts
and equipment, in varying disciplines that can greatly assist in response and recovery efforts.
Private sector partners help to restore infrastructure and they participate in both state and local
preparedness activities (Course Overview, n.d.), helping to mitigate repercussions in
emergencies.
Partnerships also build trust, making it easier to communicate and work with one another.
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Within the Federal Bureau of Investigation, there is an organization called the Office of Private
Sector. The Office of Private Sector partners with the FBI in order to develop organized and
coordinated approaches to engagement with the private sector. The operations of the office
include enhancing the FBI’s understanding of the risks and needs of the private sector as well as
increasing information sharing between the private sector and the bureau. The overall goal of the
office is to mitigate threats through long-lasting, mutually beneficial partnerships between the
federal government and the private sector (DOJ, n.d.b).
The office has also developed a group called The Domestic Security Advisory Council.
The Domestic Security Advisory Council (DSAC) is an information sharing and security
initiative between the FBI, the private sector, and the Department of Homeland Security. DSAC
enables effective communication and information sharing in order to investigate threats that
impact, specifically, American businesses. The council supports the private sector by advancing
their capabilities to protect their assets, infrastructure, employees, and proprietary information.
Essentially, the council also helps to bridge the gap that exists between fusion centers and the
private sector. Because the FBI often partners with fusion centers, DSAC’s inclusion within the
FBI gives them some access to information sharing between local fusion centers. It is these types
of partnerships that allow for mutually beneficial strategies and outcomes for fusion centers and
their abilities to assist in emergencies (DOJ, n.d.a).
Dialogue. One of the best methods to utilize when seeking to build partnerships and
encourage multidisciplinary approaches is dialogue. Dialogue is a form of conversation that
supports moving past one individual’s understanding and perspective to build collective meaning
and community. Through collaborative meetings with one another, dialogue should be enforced
in fusion centers so that each partner can share and learn different perspectives. The practice of
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dialogue allows for new understandings, creative ideas, shared leadership, and a communitybased culture of cooperation among the partners collaborating with fusion centers. Dialogue is an
effective means of establishing multidisciplinary approaches to homeland security in that it
moves the disciplines from their cultures of dependency, competition, and exclusion to increased
efforts in collaboration, partnerships, and inclusion. The disciplines can still retain their ability to
share their strengths and ideas while allowing others to learn and integrate multiple different
perspectives (A Brief Orientation to Dialogue, 2006).
In order to build dialogue in the megacommunity, targeted forums are valuable initiatives
that can be particularly beneficial for fusion centers. Targeted forums include large, cross-sector
conferences where various personnel come together for several days to discuss and collaborate
on a specific topic. This process teaches personnel how to work with one another, thus fostering
collective action. It helps them develop contacts for future collaborative projects. It also builds
trust among the partners and encourages open discussions for different ideas. Because fusion
centers acquire their intelligence through information sharing with different partners, a sense of
trust and cooperation are essential qualities that the partners must exude. The partners must be
comfortable enough with other disciplines and partners to constantly and consistently reach out
and share information. Prolonged meetings, such as the targeted forums, will assist in developing
such elements, thus supporting both the fusion centers’ objectives and the overall
megacommunity (Gerencser et al., 2008).
Leaders. In order to instill a megacommunity, it is essential to ensure that there are
leaders with certain attributes that allow the megacommunity to flourish and remain
longstanding. Namely, there are ten important key elements to becoming a successful leader in a
megacommunity. These ten qualities include a spirit of inclusiveness, tri-sector exposure, a non-
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imperial approach, navigation skills, communication skills, technological savvy, adaptability, the
talent to foster talent, presence and passion, and long-term thinking (Gerencser et al., 2008).
Inclusiveness not only applies to the megacommunity participants but also to the citizens
who stand to benefit from disciplines collaborating to ensure safety and security. A tri-sector
exposure is dependent upon a leader having experience in all three sectors including business,
government, and civil sectors. Their familiarity with the aforementioned sectors and their
responsibilities will assist in integrating the different disciplines into the megacommunity. A
non-imperial approach ensures that a leader is not overbearing, but rather supports the groups in
their work production. Navigation and communication skills involve creating pathways to
strengthening collaboration, inventing strategies that work for all, and listening and speaking to
everyone in the process effectively. Technological savvy and adaptability ensure that the leader
grows in knowledge as advancements continue and are able to progress from such technological
innovations. Leaders must also bring about each sector’s talent and continue to encourage their
most valuable qualities and capabilities. Additionally, presence and passion will support such
talents as the leaders’ passion for their responsibilities and the goals they seek to acquire will
also encourage the partners involved. Lastly, long term thinking is essential in reaching the
megacommunity’s goals. It creates sustainability where the partners in the megacommunity
begin to become invested in the megacommunity process as well as committed to ensuring that
their shared goals in homeland security are accomplished (Gerencser et al., 2008). While it may
be difficult to acquire leaders with all of these ten valuable assets, leaders should strive to
possess such strong qualities to ensure that they maintain the megacommunity.
Community resilience. One of the valuable qualities of fusion centers is that they have
close ties to the community and locality that they are based in, making them extremely beneficial
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in supporting community resilience against threats. A resilient community entails an engaged
local community, partnerships among different organizations, integration of preparedness and
response plans, and partnerships with state and federal government (Chandra et al., 2011). For
this reason, it is important that fusion centers sustain a megacommunity as they heavily support
other disciplines by allowing them this pathway to information from the local community.
Emerging Security Technologies
As society continues to advance in technology, a common threat that faces the country
are cyber threats. These types of threats are particularly concerning for fusion centers since the
centers are surrounded by technology as they utilize different hardware products and databases to
store, retrieve, and share information (DHS, 2017c). In order to remain ahead of these potential
threats, fusion centers collaborate with the cyber community. Often cyber community personnel
may be staffed in the centers, acting as analysts or IT liaisons. These personnel remain aware of
emerging security technologies that can assist in detecting and preventing threats. Additionally,
they have contacts within the federal, state, local, tribal, territorial (FSLTT), and private sector
cyber community that act as resources for providing valuable intelligence on cybersecurity and
cybercrime as well as the development of advanced hardware, software, and emerging
technologies. Cyber personnel also assist in providing detection, mitigation, and recovery
activities as they can assist law enforcement personnel with a variety of surveillance and
prosecution capabilities. They share risk information on suspicious activity or cyber indicators
with fusion centers. Such a partnership with the cyber community allows fusion centers to better
prepare for and respond to adverse cyber threats that could otherwise potentially cause numerous
security concerns for the country (DOJ, 2015).
Conclusion
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Fusion centers rely on collaborating with different partners to gather and share threatrelated information (DHS, 2018a). It is through the integration and cooperation between the
partners that the centers can share information to detect, mitigate, and prevent manmade
incidents. Additionally, the centers have the potential to assist in all hazards and emergency
management (Harris, 2008). Coordinating with disciplines such as police, fire, public health, and
emergency management allows the centers to become part of a megacommunity that integrates
these partners’ efforts to prepare for and prevent emergencies. Such collaboration helps to
integrate different skills and gather and share information in a timely fashion, thus building
community resilience and security of the country.
Chapter 11 will include public health and pandemic issues and their relation to fusion
centers. It will address current public health challenges as well as how to prepare for and respond
to them.
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Chapter 11: Public Health and Pandemic Issues
Introduction
As threats to public health expand, there is a need to better prepare for, respond to, and
recover from such incidents. Fusion centers remain in a position where they can assist in such
activities by sharing data and collaborating with various public health agencies, law enforcement
personnel, and response teams in emergencies. By strengthening fusion centers’ efforts to
coordinate with public health, they can share data and provide strategic and tactical information
that will contribute to mitigating public health incidents such as weapons of mass destruction,
explosives, and pandemics.
Scope and Complexities of Public Health Challenges
Public health threats often stem from different sources. Some emanate from terrorist
threats through biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear agents, or explosives. Others stem
from naturally occurring incidents such as influenza pandemics. While such health concerns may
originate from various sources such as manmade, natural, or accidental, most overlap in that they
result in similar challenges and adverse repercussions (U.S. Government Publishing Office,
2008).
Weapons of mass destruction. Weapons of mass destruction, including biological,
chemical, radiological, and nuclear agents, remain as one of the greatest risks to the national
security of the United States. Such agents in the possession of adversaries, hostile states, or
terrorists, have the potential to cause significant damage to the country. An attack utilizing these
weapons of mass destruction could result in critical infrastructure failure, economic instability,
and mass casualties. Not only do they have the potential to inflict harm in the United States, but
they can cause injury to military forces abroad (GPO, 2008).
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Explosives. Similar to weapons of mass destruction, explosives may be created and
planted by terrorists in an attempt to instill fear and cause mass casualties. Terrorists targeting
passenger concentrations at airports by transporting explosives through unsecured air
transportation routes remains as a serious threat. The potential of the use of explosives remains
high as terrorists often retain the necessary technological skills to make them as well as the
ability to obtain the components for improvised explosive devices. In addition to the numerous
deaths that can result from the initial blast of explosives, radioactive particles can spread
thereafter, impacting even more lives and the health of the public (GPO, 2008).
Pandemics. Unlike terrorist threats, pandemics are naturally-occurring incidents that can
negatively affect public health. Pandemics are widespread outbreaks of infectious disease that
significantly impact morbidity and mortality rates over a wide geographic area. As time
continues, pandemics appear to be increasing in frequency largely due to emerging viral diseases
from animals. Greater exploitation of the natural environment and increased global integration
and travel contribute to the increase as well. While pandemics can stem from several different
diseases, influenza is most likely to cause a massive pandemic and complicate the health of large
populations (Madhav et al., 2017). Contagious diseases such as influenza pandemics spread
rather easily and rapidly, causing a vast amount of people to be infected and even more to panic
and become fearful that they, too, will become infected (GPO, 2008).
Challenges. In addition to many hospitals already struggling to manage the volume of
patients who require care on a daily basis, the aforementioned emergencies cause greater issues.
Public health emergencies tend to result in medical surges and a drastic increase in patients in
hospitals needing immediate care. Paramedics often have to wait for extended periods of time
before patient care can be transferred to the hospital staff. An overflow of patients and high
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occupancy leads to patients being treated in emergency department hallways where they may be
held for hours before they can be placed in an inpatient bed. Transferring patients to alternative
care sites can be difficult due to the personnel, equipment, and time that is needed to do so.
Damage to infrastructure in the event of an emergency may also impede responders’ abilities to
transfer patients. A lack of disaster preparedness and response education for most medical and
nursing school curricula also contributes to the difficulty of ensuring better response efforts to
public health emergencies (Department of Health and Human Services, n.d.).
Additionally, maintaining enough resources and personnel in hospitals and public health
facilities that can assist in major incidents is a challenge. In the event of an emergency, there are
often shortages of supplies and essential equipment as many facilities in a given area use the
same suppliers for back-up stock and medical supplies. Hospitals generally face shortages in
personnel, but during emergencies such as terrorist attacks or natural disasters, such shortages
are only exacerbated. Nurses, doctors, and public health professionals have their own personal
family responsibilities that they must attend to in such incidents. They, themselves, may also
have been severely impacted or harmed by the adverse event. Others may simply be afraid to
respond during a disaster due to personal safety concerns (Department of Health and Human
Services, n.d.).
Communication failure is a constant, recurring theme often seen during and immediately
after a disaster. Emergency response involves numerous different disciplines including fire,
police, public health, emergency management, EMS, and more. These disciplines must be able to
collaborate effectively to prevent further injuries and save lives, yet it is challenging to develop a
communications system that is interoperable among all public safety disciplines as well as public
volunteers. It is also difficult to ensure enough resources, such as radio or satellite phones, for
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communication purposes especially if there may be an overflow of personnel assisting in the
disaster. Without effective preparedness plans that incorporate clear roles and responsibilities
among public health professionals, public safety personnel, and volunteers, it is nearly
impossible to mitigate an emergency (Department of Health and Human Services, n.d.). For
example, a lack of preparedness for the wide-scale attack of 9/11, impeded effective decisionmaking from command structures. Lack of effective preparedness for the magnitude of the
incident, number of responders needed, and plans to collaborate with countless public safety
personnel hampered some response efforts. Senior leaders could not reach other officials and
some did not enter the chain of command until after the morning’s attacks due to the inability to
efficiently communicate (Summary of Final Report, 2014).
In order to ensure effective communication and efficient response efforts among different
public safety disciplines, emergency departments support numerous responsibilities. The
emergency department in hospitals is the primary site were initial information regarding a
disaster is communicated. The emergency department is there to determine the extent of the
disaster so that they can ascertain how best to respond to it. The department is responsible for
handling various, different disasters and making timely and accurate response decisions such as
initiating an institutional lockdown, determining if recipient victim decontamination is needed,
and declaring an institutional disaster. Their abilities to retrieve initial information, make
decisions regarding response procedures, and share the information with the regional emergency
operations center and hospitals are crucial to mitigating an emergency (Department of Health
and Human Services, n.d.).
Fusion centers. Much like the roles of emergency departments involving information
gathering and decision making, fusion centers also support information gathering and sharing. As

116
INFORMATION SHARING: LOCAL FUSION CENTERS
threats regarding public health emanate, the importance of intelligence and sharing such
information becomes crucial in better preparing for and responding to such adverse incidents.
Due to their unique situational awareness, fusion centers can assist public health officials in
identifying, mitigating, and preventing various threats to public health (Barishansky &
Komansky, 2014).
Fusion centers have begun to expand their capabilities to an all-hazards approach with a
focus on developing partnerships with various disciplines. Public health officials can offer fusion
centers strategic and tactical information such as crime-related trends, response capabilities, and
suspicious activities related to health. Local and state public health officials often provide public
health intelligence such as communicable disease trends, environmental health findings,
surveillance observations of critical symptoms, and private healthcare-capacity such as medical
surges. In return, fusion centers develop analytic products outlining potential causes for concern
that they may identify from such information, utilize their surveillance capabilities, and use their
detection tools to better collaborate with different disciplines including homeland security and
first responder partners. Fusion centers have the ability to recognize patterns, detect connections,
and develop accurate intelligence. They can bring together expertise from distinct areas of the
emergency services community to ensure timely and efficient preparedness, response, and
recovery efforts to various health threats (Barishansky & Komansky, 2014).
Policy, Strategic, and Ethical Issues Related to Preparedness and Response
Public health concerns including weapons of mass destruction, explosives, and
pandemics are not considered new threats as these threats have previously impacted the United
States. Past incidents have greatly compromised the health of the public while also causing
significant building damage, economic loss, and mass casualties.
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Weapons of mass destruction. In 2001, B. anthracis spores, also known as anthrax, were
sent through the United States postal system in a bioterrorist attack. A public health investigation
was first implemented when an infectious disease physician recognized a potential case of
inhalation anthrax in a patient hospitalized in Florida. The diagnosis was soon confirmed by
Florida’s Department of Health (FDH) as well as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC). As the investigation continued, various victims of possible anthrax exposure turned up in
different areas of the country including Manhattan and New Jersey. Symptoms of inhalational
anthrax in New Jersey postal workers appeared and the workers were subsequently diagnosed
with anthrax exposure. Another individual staffed in the Hart Senate Office Building opened a
letter that contained a powder substance along with a note identifying the substance as anthrax.
Nasal swab tests were performed on hundreds of senate staff members and visitors to the
building, resulting in 28 victims being exposed to anthrax. Through further investigation and
analysis, the CDC was able to link four confirmed cases of anthrax as a result of intentional
delivery through mailed letters or packages. The 2001 anthrax attack resulted in 22 people
developing anthrax due to the mailings, 11 suffering from the inhalational of the substance, and 5
of them dying (Gursky, Inglesby, & O’Toole, 2003).
Explosives. Leading up to 9/11, there were several attacks by terrorists seeking to
eliminate numerous Americans and cause severe destruction. In February of 1993, a terrorist
group, led my Ramzi Yousef, attempted to bring down the World Trade Center with a truck
bomb resulting in 6 deaths and a thousand wounded. Terrorists’ bombings and threats on
Americans have also occurred outside of the U.S. In November of 1995, five Americans were
killed in a car bomb explosion that occurred outside the office of the United States program
manager for the Saudi National Guard in Riyadh. A truck bomb killed 19 United States
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servicemen in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia in 1996. Additionally, bombings of U.S. embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania occurred in 1998 and two years later, an al Qaeda team planted explosives
in a motorboat in order to blow a hole in the side of a U.S. destroyer, killing 17 American sailors
(Summary of Final Report, 2014).
Pandemics. The pandemic spread of influenza viruses is typically characterized by a
high attack rate and an increased level of mortality, namely in young adults. A rather prominent
pandemic is the 2009 Swine Flu (H1N1) pandemic. Classified as Influenza A H1N1, this new
strain of Influenza A virus caused a major outbreak of human infection in the USA and Mexico
in April of 2009. The virus is typically transmitted by respiratory droplets and can be spread by
the touch of hands. This particular strain has a higher level of transmissibility than other seasonal
influenza strains. Throughout the 2009 pandemic, many people who were infected experienced
fevers, cough, sore throat, fatigue, shortness of breath, headache, vomiting, and various other
symptoms. For those who already had medical complications such as chronic respiratory
diseases, immune suppression, neurological disorders, diabetes and obesity, however, they
experienced additional symptoms including pneumonia and peripheral neuropathy. The first
cases of influenza A H1N1 pandemic were identified in April of 2009 in the U.S. By August of
2009, approximately one million people were infected in the U.S. alone (Al-Muharrmi, 2010).
Preparedness and response efforts. These aforementioned incidents involving weapons
of mass destruction, explosives, and pandemics lead to severe repercussions on society and
public health. As advancements are made and the threats become greater, it is even more crucial
to ensure that there are efficient and effective preparedness and response efforts to combat these
growing threats.
Weapons of mass destruction. Diplomacy, threat reduction assistance, and export
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controls are all measures that must be taken in order to prepare for threats involving weapons of
mass destruction. Such measures assist in impeding other states and terrorist organizations from
using such weapons to cause severe damage to the U.S. They also help to slow down their ability
to obtain the necessary materials to develop weapons of mass destruction as well as increase
their costs to access sensitive technologies and expertise. While it is essential to protect the U.S.
from other states and terrorist organizations utilizing weapons of mass destruction on U.S. soil, it
is also important to support allies and the international community. Working closely with likeminded countries increases the United States’ ability to stop the spread of weapons of mass
destruction and develop recycle and fuel treatment technologies that are more efficient, cleaner,
and more proliferation-resistant. In order to improve the ability to gather accurate and timely
knowledge on adversaries’ capabilities regarding these weapons of mass destruction, effective
intelligence, surveillance, related technologies, and research on the evolving threats must be
reinforced. Particular emphasis should be placed on intelligence collection and analysis on
weapons of mass destruction, interaction among U.S. intelligence and law enforcement, and
intelligence cooperation with allies (GPO, 2008).
Explosives. Explosives are often acts of terrorism that include any chemical compound
mixture, or device, used to detonate a bomb such as improvised explosive devices (IED’s).
Combatting the use of explosives includes utilizing developing technologies and capabilities to
detect, locate, and render the devices safe before they detonate. This includes enhancing training
and education efforts for bomb technicians and law enforcement officials to recognize precursor
chemicals and materials used to develop improvised explosives or incendiary mixtures.
Psychological and behavioral sciences should also be used to analyze potential threats of an
explosive attack. Similar to most threats, combatting the use of explosives requires significant
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coordination among local, state, tribal, territorial, and federal governments as well as the private
sector, including operators and owners of critical infrastructure. Strengthening these partnerships
will enhance communication efforts regarding accurate and timely information sharing in the
event of a potential attack by means of explosives (GPO, 2008).
Pandemics. Because the spread of a pandemic can lead to massive suffering and
potential deaths, negative economic impacts, and mass panic by society, preparing for such
incidents is necessary. Preparedness must include means to ensure clear communication of all
responsibilities to levels of government, public health officials, and society. This entails
educating society about high-risk practices involving potential increases in virus transmissions. It
is the responsibility of health and medical officials to disperse information and education
regarding epidemic and pandemic illness. Surveillance and detection practices provide
situational awareness to ensure early warnings and detection of an outbreak of a disease and
possible pandemic. Should a pandemic occur, response and containment plans assist in
mitigating the spread of the outbreak as well as social, economic, and health impacts. Vaccines
and antivirals are essential countermeasures. There must be a sufficient amount of vaccines
available to vaccinate individuals within a certain timeframe of the emergence of the virus as
well as plans to prioritize high-risk populations. In addition to ensuring resources such as
vaccines, it is important to rapidly recruit and deploy health, medical, and veterinary providers
with the necessary skills to assist in these types of emergencies. Their assistance is vital as
pandemics will often lead to medical surges that require a vast amount of personnel to attend to
such victims. Finally, coordination among localities, states, public health officials, critical
infrastructure entities, and the private sector is essential to enhance capabilities to detect a
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potential pandemic, locate its origin, stop its spread, and mitigate the repercussions on society
(Homeland Security Council, 2005).
Fusion centers. Some commonalities among the aforementioned threats include the need
for situational awareness, timely and accurate intelligence, and effective communication and
collaboration among numerous agencies as multiple become involved in public health related
incidents. Through information gathering and sharing practices with several partners, fusion
centers provide these abilities and can help to assist in better preparedness and response practices
including public health incidents.
Terrorist attacks. Weapons of mass destruction and explosives are threats that terrorists
tend to utilize in order to instill fear in the public, inflict massive critical infrastructure damage,
impact the economy, and cause mass casualties. In order to detect such terroristic threats, it is
essential to develop timely and accurate intelligence, coordinate with local, state, and federal
governments, as well as the private sector, and share information. Often nontraditional collectors
of intelligence, such as the private sector and public safety, contribute to fusion centers by
providing important crime-related information such as risk assessments and suspicious activity.
Fusion centers, in return, combine such information with law enforcement to develop actionable
intelligence. The centers continue to reevaluate existing data in context with new data in order to
provide updates on patterns, trends, and potential threats. This supports their abilities to better
anticipate, detect, prevent, monitor, and respond to terrorist activity. Fusion centers’ information
collection on other criminal activities such as illegal drug operations, fraud, money laundering,
or identity theft can also assist in detecting a nexus between such crimes and potential terrorist
organizations. Leveraging such information and intelligence supports the rapid identification of
trends and patterns that may reflect emerging terrorist threats (DOJ, 2006). Fusion centers also
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support intelligence efforts to combat terrorist attacks by coordinating with joint terrorism task
forces, or operational groups, led by the FBI, that leverage a variety of resources from partner
agencies to investigate and disrupt terrorist threats (DOJ, 2008).
Natural incidents. While originally developed to enhance collection, analysis, and
information sharing practices to detect criminal and terrorist activity, fusion centers are
expanding to include all hazards approaches. In 2008, the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention developed a pilot program, BioPHusion, to test the operational capacity and potential
implementation of a public health fusion center. BioPHusion was developed and tested in order
to develop a network that allowed for alert verification and distribution by collecting,
monitoring, and integrating disparate kinds of health information into actionable intelligence.
Such measures were created to support public health and take precautions to detect potential
health threats such as pandemics. Similar to other fusion centers, BioPHusion maintains
situational awareness. It is also a source of public health information for use by other agencies,
such as the Department of Homeland Security. Enhancing early detection and rapid response of
potentially catastrophic infectious disease outbreaks, as well as other public health emergencies,
requires the integration of information among local, state, tribal, territorial, and federal partners.
As public health concerns, such as pandemics, emerge, it is important to develop ways to
aggregate data, access such information, and share patterns and trends with partners involved in
preparing and responding to potential pandemics. Public health fusion centers can ensure the
integration and exchange of biosurveillance information and enhance current capabilities to
gather and analyze such data. With this data and knowledge, fusion centers would be able to
disseminate information to decision makers involved in studying, preparing for, and responding
to pandemics (Khan, Fleischauer, Casani, & Groseclose, 2010).
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In order to develop national health security, it is necessary to develop intelligence and
share information related to both human-caused and natural incidents. Building national health
security requires building information sharing partnerships and leveraging one another’s
resources. Because fusion centers are focal points for information sharing, they can be extremely
beneficial to the understanding, analysis, and dissemination of threat data related to public
health. Several reports regarding public health preparedness such as the National Preparedness
Guidelines and the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act have continued to reinforce the
importance of using developing information technology and information management to support
quicker, large-scale, more effective, and higher-quality detection of, response to, and recovery
from public health emergencies. Such practices can be developed and strengthened through the
use of fusion centers, enhancing the quality and quantity of pertinent data from which to identify
relevant threats (DOJ, 2011).
Leadership Challenges of Public Health
Because public health threats such as weapons of mass destruction, explosives, and
pandemics require numerous personnel in preparation and response efforts, leadership can
remain a challenge in public health scenarios. Personnel can range from law enforcement, public
health officials, the private sector, and the public. Public health incidents require teamwork in
order to prevent attacks, protect infrastructure and people, minimize damage, and expedite
recovery (GPO, 2008). With so many different personnel involved in public health incidents with
different roles and responsibilities, however, it can be difficult to manage such incidents and
ensure effective response efforts.
Within the varying agencies and sectors, leadership from the healthcare industry is key to
an effective response. Whether an attack includes weapons of mass destruction or explosives or
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the spread of a pandemic, public health personnel play a vital role in response efforts. Doctors,
nurses, EMS personnel, and critical care physicians all assist in these incidents that often lead to
surge capacity within hospitals where patients require immediate assistance. Leaders within
different hospitals must also be linked to assist patient transfers and provide mutual aid
(Department of Health and Human Services, n.d.).
Effective preparedness and response efforts demand an established leadership structure
with clear organizational responsibilities. In order to organize roles and responsibilities,
including leadership, it is crucial to develop a hospital incident command system (HICS) in the
event of an emergency. HICS is a widely used emergency management system for health care
facilities that provides a chain of command that can quickly mobilize. Identifying the appropriate
individuals to make decisions is crucial in a fast-speed disaster that can stem from incidents such
as weapons of mass destruction, explosives, and pandemics. HICS allows such personnel to
ensure accountability of position functions, allow for a flexible response to certain emergencies,
improve documentation of facility actions throughout the emergency, provide a common
language to facilitate outside personnel assisting, effectively manage an incident, and develop
response checklists for senior leadership. Most importantly, those maintaining leadership roles
within the incident management system must be knowledgeable of operations of other hospitals
and community disaster responses as well as be trained in effectively managing incidents that
require collaboration among numerous personnel in public health and public safety (Department
of Health and Human Services, n.d.).
Conclusion
Impending public health threats such as weapons of mass destruction, explosives, and
pandemics remain a serious concern for the United States. As these threats expand and grow, it is
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crucial to develop and implement efficient preparedness and response efforts. Fusion centers, in
particular, can be beneficial to preparedness and response practices for public health related
incidents. Their abilities to provide situational awareness to a locality, develop sound and
accurate intelligence, inform decisions based on developed information, and collaborate among
numerous public safety partners makes them a valuable resource to public health officials. By
collaborating and cooperating with fusion centers, public health officials can better detect,
mitigate, and prevent public health related incidents.

126
INFORMATION SHARING: LOCAL FUSION CENTERS
Conclusion
After September 11th 2001, the need for better communication and information sharing
practices among law enforcement partners became very evident (National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks, 2004). Recognizing a communication gap among law enforcement agencies,
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) developed
several new fusion centers to serve a critical role in identifying, analyzing, and sharing emerging
threat-related information among law enforcement partners (FBI, 2009).
Today, fusion centers remain a valuable asset to local law enforcement agencies and
homeland security personnel as they gather and analyze information, develop actionable
intelligence, and share such intelligence with several partners (DHS, 2017c). Remaining in
various urban areas, local fusion centers retain situational awareness allowing them to assist local
law enforcement efforts as well as contribute to the national threat picture (DHS, 2017d). Their
partnerships with numerous law enforcement agencies and homeland security personnel allow
them to alleviate deconfliction problems, develop connections in investigations, and identify
threats in an efficient and effective manner.
Because local fusion centers play a crucial role in supporting criminal and terrorist
investigations, it is valuable to continue to enhance their information sharing practices. My twopart strategy consisting of strengthening current partnerships among fusion center analysts, local
law enforcement personnel, and local FBI joint terrorism task forces, and developing and
implementing a standardized training program for intelligence analysts aims to strengthen
communication among law enforcement and enhance analysis and dissemination of intelligence.
Through the use of efficient managers, strategic planning and budgeting, policy development and
analysis, and information technology protection, the aforementioned plans can be developed and
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implemented to strengthen communication and enhance uniformity of proficiencies and practices
among all fusion centers.
In implementing the plans to enhance information sharing among fusion centers,
procedures are needed to not only generate the seamless exchange of information among law
enforcement partners, but to ensure that such practices and procedures are guided by the
Constitution and abide by international human rights. Developing such procedures reassures the
public that in the process of enhancing information sharing practices among fusion centers,
Americans’ individual liberties will remain protected. This also allows the public to provide
greater support for fusion centers and recognize their value in protecting the community.
Not only have fusion centers had success in criminal and terrorist investigations (DHS,
2015e), but they continue to expand their resources and capabilities in gathering information and
developing intelligence to other areas of expertise as well. They have begun to expand their
capabilities to an all-hazards approach focusing on developing partnerships with various
disciplines including public health and emergency management (Harris, 2008). They also
collaborate with the private sector to aid in reducing risks to the community (DHS, 2014). The
expansion of fusion centers’ information sharing partners demonstrates their value in being able
to assist the community in many ways and protect them from various threats and disasters. Not
only have fusion centers continued to expand their connections with partners within the U.S., but
they have also developed connections with law enforcement in other countries. As seen with one
of America’s allies in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia seems to be moving in the direction of
developing similar information sharing centers as they have already established “fusion cells”
where various partners, including Saudi Arabian intelligence officials and U.S. law enforcement
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personnel, can work together to investigate and interdict terrorism plots (Saudi Arabia &
Counterterrorism April, 2017).
As criminals and terrorists continue to find new ways to attack, fusion centers’ ability to
remain at the forefront of information gathering and disseminating among agencies can assist in
various forms of crimes. Cybercrimes, for example, continue to expand as advancements in
technology and both the availability and access to information grow. Such newly emerging
crimes can emanate from terrorists or nation states threating local communities and the security
of the United States. Fusion centers’ situational awareness and contact with local law
enforcement officials can greatly assist in detecting a potential threat to the community and
subsequently responding to it. Furthermore, they can disseminate intelligence forewarning other
centers, agencies, and law enforcement officials of the potential threats in a timely and efficient
manner. It is this unique ability of recognizing various forms of threats, gathering and analyzing
information, and disseminating intelligence among law enforcement partners that helps to
influence rapid response efforts and prevent the threat.
As new, greater threats continue to transpire, enhancing fusion centers’ information
sharing capabilities becomes more and more important. Their situational awareness, partnerships
with law enforcement personnel, and ability to gather, analyze, develop, and share actionable
intelligence makes them invaluable in being able to protect communities. By continuing to
improve information sharing among local fusion centers and leveraging their resources and
capabilities to exchange information with several partners, fusion centers can better identify,
mitigate, and prevent threats impacting public safety and the security of the country.
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